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EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION IN AUSTRALIAN 
CRIMINAL COURTS: A COMPLEX VARIABLE WITH 
MULTIPLE EFFECTS*
LUKE McNAMARA, JULIA QUILTER, KATE SEEAR AND ROBIN ROOM**
This article reports on the second stage of a national study of how the 
effects of alcohol and other drugs are treated by criminal laws and the 
criminal justice system. Based on a mixed methods analysis of more than 
300 appellate court decisions from all Australian jurisdictions handed 
down in the period 2010–2014, we identify the multiple points at which 
legal significance is attached to evidence that the accused, the victim 
or a witness was ‘intoxicated’ at the time of the alleged commission of 
a criminal offence. Focusing on the rules and principles endorsed by 
appellate courts in relation to four key ‘sites’ of criminal justice decision-
making — the admissibility of police interviews, the credibility and 
reliability of witness testimony, adjudication on the criminal responsibility 
of the accused, and determination of sentence for convicted offenders — 
we show that the impact of intoxication on the enforcement of the criminal 
law is complex. There is no single characterisation that can account for 
the multiple points at which intoxication may need to be assessed, and 
the divergent ways in which it can impact on adjudication. Depending 
on a range of site-specific and case-specific considerations, intoxication 
evidence may expand/contract the parameters of criminal responsibility, 
and it may yield higher or lower criminal penalties.
I  INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen intense policy and law reform debates in most Australian 
jurisdictions about the relevance of intoxication in the context of decisions about 
criminal responsibility and punishment.1 These debates have a long history, 
and the law’s normative characterisation of intoxication has moved between 
mitigatory and aggravatory positions, shaped by both common law developments 
1 See Julia Quilter, ‘One-Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an Aggravating 
Factor: Implications for NSW Criminal Law’ (2014) 3(1) International Journal for Crime, Justice and 
Social Democracy 81.
* The research on which this article reports is funded by the Australian Institute of Criminology’s 
Criminology Research Grants Program 2014/15. We acknowledge the excellent research assistance 
provided by Jai Clark.
** Dr Luke McNamara is a Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of New South Wales. Dr 
Julia Quilter is an Associate Professor in the School of Law at the University of Wollongong. Dr Kate 
Seear is an ARC DECRA Fellow and Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University, 
and an Adjunct Fellow in the Social Studies of Addiction Concepts research program at the National 
Drug Research Institute, Curtin University. Professor Robin Room is the Director of the Centre for 
Alcohol Policy Research at La Trobe University, and Professor at Stockholm University.
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and statutory reforms. The topic of the so-called ‘defence’ of intoxication in 
Australian criminal law has received considerable attention, in the journal 
literature,2 and in textbooks,3 although often in a way that is largely abstracted 
from specific case contexts. There is a heavy emphasis on normative discussion 
of the controversial specific/general intent distinction which is central to the 
rules governing the availability of the intoxication ‘defence’.4 The multiple other 
ways in which intoxication evidence impacts on the administration of criminal 
justice and the operation of the criminal law have been largely ignored in the 
literature.5 This article represents the first attempt to illuminate how the concept 
of ‘intoxication’ is given meaning in Australian appellate courts.
This article is part of a larger study of the ‘knowledges’ and assumptions about 
the intoxication-violence relationship that are reflected in Australian criminal 
laws.6 The study seeks to map and assess the several and diverse ways that the 
effects of alcohol and other drugs (‘AOD’) are implicated in the construction 
and enforcement of the criminal law, and the administration of criminal justice 
generally. The larger ambition is that the generation of a more robust and nuanced 
empirical foundation than has previously been available in the scholarly literature 
can improve the quality and integrity of policy-making and law reform in relation 
to how the criminal law might better meet the needs of the community with 
2 See, eg, Andrew Hemming, ‘Banishing Evidence of Intoxication in Determining Whether a Defendant 
Acted Voluntarily and Intentionally’ (2010) 29 University of Tasmania Law Review 1; A P Simester, 
‘Intoxication is Never a Defence’ [2009] Criminal Law Review 3; Julia Tolmie, ‘Intoxication and 
Criminal Liability in New South Wales: A Random Patchwork?’ (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 
218; Mitchell Keiter, ‘Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense’ (1997) 87 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 482; Stephen Gough, ‘Intoxication and Criminal Liability: 
The Law Commission’s Proposed Reforms’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 335; Jeremy Horder, 
‘Sobering Up? The Law Commission on Criminal Intoxication’ (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 
534; David McCord, ‘The English and American History of Voluntary Intoxication to Negate Mens 
Rea’ (1990) 11 Journal of Legal History 372; Alan R Ward, ‘Making Some Sense of Self-Induced 
Intoxication’ (1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal 247; Paul H Robinson, ‘Causing the Conditions of 
One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine’ (1985) 71 Virginia 
Law Review 1; Alan D Gold, ‘An Untrimmed “Beard”: The Law of Intoxication as a Defence to a 
Criminal Charge’ (1976) 19 Criminal Law Quarterly 34.
3 See, eg, Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson Reuters, 
4th ed, 2017) 283–303; Thalia Anthony et al, Waller & Williams Criminal Law: Text and Cases 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 12th ed, 2013) ch 15; E Colvin, J McKechnie and J O’Leary, Criminal Law 
in Queensland and Western Australia: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 
2015) ch 18.
4 See, eg, Bronitt and McSherry, above n 3, 290–33; Colvin, McKechnie and O’Leary, above n 3, 450; 
Anthony et al, above n 3, 994; Andreas Schloenhardt, Queensland Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 566–7; Jeremy Gans, Modern Criminal Law of Australia (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 153.
5 For an exception, see Mirko Bagaric, Ross on Crime (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2013) 833. See also 
the work on intoxication and sentencing undertaken periodically by the New South Wales Judicial 
Commission and the New South Wales Sentencing Council: Ivan Potas and Donna Spears, ‘Alcohol 
as a Sentencing Factor: A Survey of Attitudes of Judicial Officers’ (Monograph Series No 8, Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales, June 1994); New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Sentencing for 
Alcohol-Related Violence’ (Report, March 2009); New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Alcohol 
and Drug Fuelled Violence’ (Report, August 2015). 
6 Julia Quilter et al, ‘New National Study Examines Intoxication in Criminal Law’ (2015) 2 Law Society 
of New South Wales Journal 76; Julia Quilter et al, ‘The Definition and Significance of “Intoxication” 
in Australian Criminal Law: A Case Study of Queensland’s “Safe Night Out” Legislation’ (2016) 
16(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Review 42.
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respect to the attribution of criminal responsibility for AOD-related anti-social 
behaviour, harms and risks. 
The first stage of our larger study focused on the legislative approach to 
intoxication, by examining the definition and significance of intoxication in 
Australian criminal law statutes and regulations. We identified and analysed 
more than 500 criminal law provisions that attach significance to a person’s 
intoxication, for a wide variety of purposes — from enlivening a coercive police 
power to influencing the sentencing process.7 
This article reports on the second stage of the study, which is concerned with 
illuminating judicial approaches to intoxication, with a focus on appellate courts. 
Although the legislative arm of government has been more heavily involved 
in the creation of criminal laws that attach significance to intoxication,8 the 
judiciary remains an important part of the criminal justice system in relation 
to the operation of many of these laws (in addition to relevant statutory 
provisions and common law rules), as well as making assessments in relation 
to the relevance of intoxication evidence. Magistrates and judges are regularly 
called upon to adjudicate on the relevance that should be attached to intoxication 
evidence, whether for assessing evidence admissibility or weight, the utility or 
otherwise of warnings and directions, adjudicating on criminal responsibility or 
deciding on the sentence to be handed down. We recognise appellate courts as an 
authoritative voice of ‘knowledge’ on the nature and relevance of intoxication for 
criminal law purposes, and therefore, equally deserving of scholarly attention. 
Their public pronouncements are designed not only to influence future criminal 
law enforcement and court room practices, but also to communicate with and 
educate the wider community about the significance of alcohol and drug use for 
the criminal law.
In conceiving the larger study of which this article is a part, we identified appellate 
decisions in criminal cases as a fertile source of data regarding the manner in 
which the criminal law concept of intoxication is interpreted and operationalised. 
We recognised that the judiciary continues to play an important role in monitoring 
past, and guiding future, approaches to the treatment of intoxication evidence 
in criminal trials. In deciding how to ‘access’ the judicial dimension of how 
intoxication is treated in Australian criminal law, we determined that a traditional 
doctrinal approach to case law research, in which we limited ourselves to locating, 
describing and discussing the rules contained in authoritative precedents, would 
be inadequate to meet our objectives.9 We concluded that a more wide-ranging 
and systematic review, across all Australian jurisdictions, would support a 
valuable contribution to the literature. This article provides a snapshot of how 
and where ‘intoxication’ features in higher appellate court decisions in criminal 
cases. It illuminates how appellate courts approach the concept of intoxication, 
7 See Julia Quilter et al, ‘Criminal Law and the Effects of Alcohol and Other Drugs: A National Study 
of the Significance of “Intoxication” in Australian Legislation’ (2016) 39 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 913.
8 Ibid.
9 Cf Catriona Cook et al, Laying Down the Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2015) ch 6.
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in criminal cases where the use of alcohol and/or other drugs form part of the 
evidence before the court, and how they guide first instance trial and sentencing 
courts to approach intoxication evidence.
To these ends, this article reports on the collection, categorisation and analysis 
of more than 300 higher appellate court decisions in Australia, in which there 
was evidence that the accused, the victim and/or a witness was intoxicated at the 
time of the commission of the offence. Its primary aims are to: (i) determine how 
and where intoxication evidence arises for consideration in the judicial phase 
of criminal justice administration; (ii) identify the rules, practices and tests 
for assessing intoxication that are endorsed and employed by appellate courts 
in relation to the relevance of intoxication and how the state of ‘intoxication’ 
should be defined and evidenced; and (iii) assess the role that intoxication plays 
in shaping the operational parameters of criminal responsibility and influencing 
the nature and severity of sentences handed down. 
Our chief conclusions are that: decisions about intoxication are made at multiple 
points in the criminal court process; the absence of a widely understood definition 
of intoxication for criminal law purposes produces a variety of approaches 
to establishing whether an accused person, victim or witness was relevantly 
intoxicated; and, contrary to the dominant contemporary political narrative that 
adverse moral judgment should always attach to criminal offending associated 
with alcohol and drug use, Australian courts recognise the complex relationship 
between intoxication and criminalisation. Depending on a range of site-specific 
and case-specific considerations, intoxication evidence may expand or contract 
the parameters of criminal responsibility, and it may yield higher or lower 
criminal penalties.
II  METHODOLOGY
We collected all decisions of the highest criminal appellate court in each state 
and territory,10 and the High Court of Australia, which were handed down in a 
five-year period from January 2010 to December 2014,11 in which the intoxication 
of the accused, the victim or a witness formed part of the evidence in the case. 
We determined that a five-year time period would yield a data-set of a sufficient 
size and composition to illustrate contemporary appellate court approaches to 
intoxication evidence across the range of evidentiary, substantive offence and 
10 Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Northern 
Territory Court of Criminal Appeal, Queensland Court of Appeal, South Australian Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, Victorian Court of Appeal, Western Australian Court 
of Appeal.
11 We note that two Australian jurisdictions made relevant changes to sentencing laws during 2014. In 
New South Wales and Queensland self-induced intoxication was expressly excluded as a mitigating 
factor: see New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Alcohol and Drug Fuelled Violence’, above n 5. 
Because these changes occurred late in the period under review they will not be reflected in New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal and Queensland Court of Appeal decisions in our data-set. 
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sentencing questions identified in our pilot research — in the context of conviction 
appeals, sentence appeals, and Crown appeals against sentence.
While noting that we did not set out to select a representative sample of Australian 
criminal cases,12 we do acknowledge the limitations of including only higher 
appellate court decisions in our data-set, in a context where the vast majority 
of criminal law matters are finalised at the lower levels of the criminal court 
hierarchy, without appeal to a State/Territory Court of Appeal/Court of Criminal 
Appeal,13 and where most appeals from Magistrates/Local Courts are heard by 
single judge intermediate courts (such as the Victorian County Court or the WA 
District Court). Nonetheless, in our view, so little empirical research has been 
done on how the concept of ‘intoxication’ operates in Australian criminal courts 
that, even with these limitations, the study represents an important and original 
contribution to the literature.   
To ensure comprehensive inclusion of all publicly available judgments handed 
down in the review period (whether officially reported or not), the primary 
mechanism for identification of relevant cases was online searching using the 
web-based open access Austlii database. Secondary searches were conducted 
using LexisNexis and relevant court websites.14 We searched each of the nine 
Australian jurisdictions in turn, for the identified time frame (2010–2014). Our 
primary search term was ‘intoxication’, with variations employed to maximise 
search accuracy.15 Search results were filtered to ensure that only criminal law 
cases were included, and that all cases did, in fact, involve evidence of intoxication 
in some way.16 A full list of cases is contained in Appendix A.
12 The rules governing access to appeal (whether by right or with leave) obviously influence the types of 
matters that come before higher appellate courts, and it is not possible to assess whether the frequency 
with which certain issues recurred in our sample is illustrative of patterns at first instance trials or 
sentencing hearings. We note that the appellate court decisions we reviewed regularly summarised 
extracts from jury directions, trial transcripts, expert evidence and sentencing remarks, and so, to 
that extent, provide something of a ‘window’ into how intoxication evidence is addressed in lower 
and intermediate courts. 
13 Given that intoxication features in numerous criminal law statutes and given the available evidence 
of the involvement of AOD use in a significant proportion of the high-volume offences in lower courts 
(eg driving offences, public order offences, assaults; see Quilter et al, ‘Criminal Law and the Effects 
of Alcohol and Other Drugs’, above n 7), how intoxication evidence plays out in this major tier of the 
criminal court system will be an important topic for future research.
14 See, eg, the cases database available on the website of the Supreme Court of Queensland: Supreme 
Court Library Queensland, (25 July 2017) CaseLaw <http://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/>.
15 Search terms used in combination with ‘intoxication’ included ‘victim’, ‘offence element’, 
‘mitigating’, ‘aggravating’ and ‘sentencing’. Alternative search terms were used to pick up cases 
where intoxication was in issue even if the word was not used in the judgment (eg ‘drugs’, ‘alcohol’ 
and ‘intoxicating substances’).
16 In a small number of criminal cases the judgment had used the word ‘intoxication’ (or a variation) 
— eg in one case, to note that the accused was not intoxicated at the time — but closer review 
confirmed that the case was not one in which there was any evidence of the accused, the victim or 
a witness being intoxicated. Such cases were excluded from the data. A case qualified for inclusion 
if it included evidence of accused/victim/witness intoxication. We did not additionally require that 
intoxication was directly germane to a ground of appeal for a case to be included. One case was 
included even though the accused was not intoxicated at the time of the offence in question: Bugmy v 
The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 (‘Bugmy’). This decision of the High Court of Australia was included 
because of its wider significance on the sentencing of intoxicated offenders, specifically Indigenous 
offenders (see discussion below).  
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The collected cases (n = 327) were analysed using a two-step process. The first 
quantitative stage involved reading and categorising each case according to 
jurisdiction, offence type,17 type of appeal (conviction, sentence or Crown appeal) 
and the purpose(s) for which intoxication evidence was said to be relevant. In 
relation to the purposes for which intoxication evidence was considered relevant, 
we used a 12-part typology (see Figure 1). In addition to allowing us to determine 
the relative frequency with which different types of intoxication inquiries were 
undertaken, this exercise also allowed us to identify sub-sets of cases for the 
second stage of qualitative analysis (on which we expand below).
Figure 1: Purposes of Intoxication Evidence in Criminal Cases
* Or to support proof of an element of an offence
III  QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
Although the word ‘intoxication’ has traditionally been associated with the effects 
of alcohol consumption, it is now routinely used more broadly in Australian 
criminal laws to refer to the effects of alcohol and a long list of other drugs.18 We 
found, however, that alcohol was the drug that was most frequently involved in 
the cases we reviewed. The majority of the cases in our data-set were concerned 
with intoxication by alcohol alone (220 cases or 67 per cent of the total). Cannabis 
was involved in 41 cases and amphetamine/methamphetamine in only 18 cases. 
34 cases involved multiple substances (usually including alcohol). Other drugs 
17 Where the case involved multiple charges, we categorised according to the most serious charge (as 
defined by maximum penalty).
18 See, eg, s 428A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) states: ‘“intoxication” means intoxication because 
of the influence of alcohol, a drug or any other substance’, and ‘“drug” includes a drug within the 
meaning of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 and a poison, restricted substance or drug of 
addiction within the meaning of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966’; see also Quilter et al, 
‘The Definition and Significance of “Intoxication” in Australian Criminal Law’, above n 6, 47–8.  
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featured very rarely.19 Because our methodology focused on appellate decisions, 
we are unable to claim that our data-set was necessarily representative of the 
frequency with which different drugs are associated with criminal charges. 
However, in light of the intense media scrutiny, in recent years, of the role of 
‘ice’ (crystal methamphetamine) in contributing to criminal violence,20 it is worth 
noting that this category of illicit drug featured in just six per cent of cases in our 
sample.21 Alcohol was 10 times more likely to be the drug involved in criminal 
appeal cases that raised intoxication issues.22
Table 1 summarises the distribution of the sample of 327 cases across jurisdictions 
and offence type. More than three-quarters of the cases involved serious charges 
of homicide (25 per cent), non-fatal violence (27 per cent) or sexual offences (28 
per cent). Only a relatively small number of cases arose out of the driving context, 
and the majority of these involved serious charges where drunk (or drug) driving 
had caused serious harm or death. Although worth noting, the concentration 
of cases at the more serious end of the spectrum is unsurprising given that the 
seriousness of the crime(s) of which a person has been convicted and/or length of 
sentence are likely to influence decisions about whether to appeal.
Table 2 summarises the outcome of our categorisation of the cases according to 
the 12-part typology of purposes for which intoxication evidence may be relevant. 
For offender and victim intoxication respectively, Tables 3 and 4 cross-match the 
quantitative data according to offence type and the purpose for which intoxication 
evidence was considered.
19 Heroin (seven), cocaine (two), methadone (two), valium (two), oxyconton, zolpidem (‘Stilnox’), 
benzodiazepine (‘Xanax’), flunitrazepam (‘Rohypnol’), LSD, venlafaxine (‘Effexor’), anabolic 
steroid. Elsewhere, we have examined whether trial and appellate processes and decision-making in 
relation to intoxication are sufficiently sensitive to the different effects of different drugs: Julia Quilter 
and Luke McNamara, ‘The Meaning of “Intoxication” in Australian Criminal Cases: Origins and 
Operation’ New Criminal Law Review (forthcoming).
20 See, eg, David Meddows, ‘Ice Killers: How the Toxic Drug Affects the Brain to Fuel Rage and 
Violence’, The Daily Telegraph (online), 7 December 2015 <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/
news/nsw/ice-killers-how-the-toxic-drug-effects-the-brain-to-fuel-rage-and-violence/news-story/
f4b941de52807a7a811297f4b3c486f3>.
21 Noting that the data-set consists of appellate decisions handed down in the period 2010–2014, we 
acknowledge that there may be a ‘lag’ between the increase in ice usage that has occurred in Australia 
during the early 2010s (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
‘National Ice Action Strategy 2015’ (Report, 2015) 9) and the appearance of ice-related intoxication 
cases in appellate courts, such that the proportion of cases where methamphetamine features may be 
higher in the second half of the 2010s and the future. 
22 For a review of the evidence on the relationship between violence, alcohol and other drugs, see Julia 
Quilter et al, ‘“Intoxication” and Australian Criminal Law: Implications for Addressing Alcohol and 
Other Drug-Related Harms and Risks’ (Report, Australian Institute of Criminology, forthcoming).
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Table 1: Australian Criminal Appeal Decisions Featuring Intoxication 
Evidence, 2010–2014: Offence Type x Jurisdiction
ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA HCA Total
Homicide 1 21 2 26 3 1 13 12 2 81
Sexual/Indecent 
assault 1 22 3 12 6 0 17 10 0 71
Child sexual assault 0 4 0 0 3 1 4 7 0 19
Assaults 4 19 4 18 5 5 19 13 2 89
Driving harms 1 9 0 4 2 2 1 3 0 22
Property* 1 12 0 4 3 4 5 4 0 33
Drug 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 3
Other 0 2 0 3 2 0 0 2 0 9
Total 8 89 9 69 24 13 59 52 4 327
* This category includes ‘hybrid’ property/violence offences such as robbery, and property damage 
offences such as arson.
 Table 2: Type and Frequency of Purposes for which Intoxication Addressed
ACCUSED INTOXICATED
Intoxication during police custody/interview n = 14
Credibility/reliability n = 27
‘Contributing’ to offence n = 27
Element of an offence (or to support proof of an element) n = 8
Aggravating element of an offence n = 4
To negative mens rea or support a defence n = 66
Relevant to sentencing n = 145
Other n = 21
VICTIM INTOXICATED
Credibility/reliability n = 29
Relevant to proof of non-consent (sexual assault) n = 19
Sentencing (aggravating) n = 20
WITNESS INTOXICATED
Credibility/reliability n = 15
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Table 4: Victim’s Intoxication: Offence Type x Purpose
Credibility/
reliability
Element of offence 
(consent) Sentencing
Homicide 2 0 4 
Sexual Assault 21 16 10 
Child Sexual Assault 2 2 4 
Assaults 1 0 2
Driving harm 0 0 0
Property 2 0 1
Drugs 0 0 0
Other 0 1 0
Total 28 19 21
As anticipated, the context in which the relevance of intoxication was most 
frequently considered was sentencing. The total sample (n = 327)23 included 
134 appeals against convictions, 184 appeals against sentence and 45 Crown 
appeals against sentence.24 Also expected was the large number of cases (66) in 
which evidence of the accused’s intoxication was said to be relevant to mens rea 
elements or a defence. There were also a significant number of cases in contexts 
which feature less commonly in policy debates (and scholarship) on the relevance 
of intoxication evidence.
In 71 cases the relevance of intoxication to the credibility and/or reliability 
of a person’s testimony (whether accused, victim or witness) was in issue. In 
68 instances the relevance of the intoxication of the victim was the subject of 
consideration. The large majority of such cases involved sexual offences. The 
approach, attitudes and guidance offered by appellate courts in these contexts will 
23 Some cases involved more than one type of appeal (eg conviction and sentence).
24 Sentencing appeals constitute the majority of the criminal law case-load of higher appellate courts: 
see David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of 
New South Wales (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 279–80.
Figure 2: Selected Sites of Intoxication Evidence in Criminal Courts
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be analysed in more detail below. Finally, our sample included cases in which the 
court considered the admissibility of evidence gathered during police interview 
with an intoxicated suspect. Although not large in number, we identified these 
cases as warranting closer analysis because this ‘site’ is so rarely one that attracts 
scholarly attention, and because it bears out our starting premise that assessments 
about whether a person was/is intoxicated, and the significance of this ‘state’, are 
made at multiple points in the administration of criminal justice.
Based on these preliminary quantitative analyses and categorisations, we 
identified four ‘sites’ for closer qualitative analysis (see Figure 2), a selection 
process that was influenced by a range of factors. The frequency with which they 
occurred in the data-set, and their prominence in policy and law reform debates, 
meant that we chose to investigate further the following two categories: 
(i) appeals from trials at which evidence of the accused’s intoxication was said 
to be relevant to the accused’s guilt (or otherwise), including cases in which 
the accused had raised a ‘defence’ of intoxication (going to voluntariness 
or mens rea) or where intoxication evidence was considered relevant in 
relation to a discrete full or partial defence (eg provocation); and
(ii) sentence appeals (defendant or Crown) in assault and sexual assault cases,25 
in which the court addressed the relevance (if any) of the defendant’s 
intoxication at the time of the commission of the offence as a potential 
mitigating or aggravating factor. 
We also selected for closer analysis two categories of cases because the issues they 
raise have been relatively invisible in debates over the criminal law significance 
of intoxication:
(iii) conviction appeals in which a central issue was the admissibility of 
statements made by a suspect during a police interview conducted at a time 
when s/he was intoxicated; and
(iv) conviction appeals in sexual offence cases in which the intoxication of the 
victim was considered in relation to her/his reliability and credibility as a 
complainant and/or in relation to proof of the absence of consent.
IV  QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SITES
We have deliberately chosen four different points in the ‘sequence’ of criminal 
justice decision-making as our sites for closer analysis of how intoxication 
is conceived and how it influences adjudication: pre-trial police interviews; 
assessments of witness credibility and reliability, specifically in sexual assault 
25 We determined that reviewing all cases in our data-set that fell into these two major offence categories 
(n = 179) would provide us with a sufficient sub-sample to identify jurisdictional patterns of similarity/
difference, as well as the opportunity to consider whether there was any evidence of differences in 
the significance attached to offender intoxication as between non-fatal violence offences and sexual 
offences.    
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trials; the assessment of criminal responsibility, including the availability of 
defences; and sentencing. Each of the sites could usefully be the subject of article-
length treatment — given, as we noted earlier, their relative invisibility in the 
scholarly literature on intoxication and criminal law. However, it is not our aim 
here to provide a comprehensive overview of the laws throughout Australia that 
pertain to, respectively, police interviews, sexual assault trials, responsibility/
defences and sentencing. Such a treatment is neither feasible nor necessary, given 
the aims of this article. Rather, we seek to produce novel insights about the concept 
of intoxication in Australian criminal law, through the ‘side-by-side’ analysis of 
four sites of criminal justice decision-making that are commonly treated in the 
literature (if at all) as discrete settings where intoxication evidence may arise.26 
Two key insights are generated from this approach. First, we are able to show that 
definitional uncertainty regarding what is meant by ‘intoxication’ exists across 
the full spectrum of criminal justice decision-making from police interviewing 
to sentencing. Second, we are able to draw attention to the fact that a recurring 
feature of the influence that intoxication exerts, across multiple decision-making 
‘sites’, is that it is often a ‘double-edged’ sword: evidence of intoxication can both 
facilitate and impede convictions, and raise and lower penalties.
In this study, we have actively resisted the familiar impulse to move swiftly 
to normative proscriptions and law reform recommendations. We assert that 
mapping exercises and foundational empirical analyses of the sort presented 
in this article — involving the collection, presentation and analysis of original 
quantitative and qualitative data on the operational concept of ‘intoxication’ — 
are an essential pre-condition to sound evaluation and reform, as well as being 
important contributions in their own right. We hope that our study will encourage 
more detailed site-specific studies into how the conception of intoxication is 
implicated in criminal court adjudication and other decision-making points in 
criminal justice administration and that it can also make a useful contribution to 
future policy debates and sober assessment of law reform proposals.
To summarise, the discussion that follows is designed to do two things. First, 
we want to provide further (selective) detail to demonstrate the point we have 
already made about the multiple decision-making instances at which criminal 
courts attend to the relevance of intoxication evidence, including the challenges 
posed by what is a poorly defined and understood concept. Secondly (and 
relatedly), against the grain of the traditional tendency to essentialise intoxication 
questions in criminal law as about exculpation (or mitigation) versus inculpation 
(or aggravation) — that is, in dichotomous normative terms — we aim to 
demonstrate that, in practice, intoxication plays a more complex and contingent 
role in criminal case adjudication and in the ultimate determination of the 
26 Brown et al, above n 24, a text with an earned reputation for unsettling casebook conventions, adopts 
such an approach: 71–4 (drink spiking), 456 (police interviews), 590 (assault), 537–9, 544–54 (public 
order), 707 (sexual assault), 217–22, 881–6 (intoxication ‘defence’) and 1251 (sentencing). See also 
Bronitt and McSherry, above n 3: 283–303 (intoxication ‘defence’ and other defences), 687–8 (rape 
and sexual assault), 688–90 (drink spiking), 906-7 (public order). 
 
Monash University Law Review (Vol 43, No 1)160
parameters of criminal responsibility and severity of punishment. It follows that 
the policy behind legislative moves to pre-empt or ‘fix’ the site-specific relevance 
of intoxication can be confounded by competing considerations and interpretation 
of the evidence. 
A  ‘Voluntariness’ and Police Interviews
Appellate court consideration of the interviewing by police of intoxicated suspects 
arises within the legal context of both the laws governing detention and police 
interrogation, and the rules governing the admissibility of evidence that may have 
been unfairly or improperly obtained. In the first category, some jurisdictions 
have enacted legislation that expressly establishes that a person should not be 
questioned while intoxicated.27 These provisions recognise that it is inappropriate 
to interview a suspect while s/he is intoxicated, including because of the risk of 
unfairness to an accused, but also because it may compromise the accuracy of the 
fact-finding exercise. In those jurisdictions where no such legislation has been 
enacted,28 the legitimacy of questioning of an intoxicated person will be assessed 
according to the common law on ‘voluntariness’.29
The mere fact that a person was interviewed while intoxicated does not, however, 
automatically mandate that any evidence so obtained will be excluded. Particularly 
where serious crimes of violence are involved, a blanket prohibition on any and all 
inculpatory evidence gathered during an interview with an intoxicated offender 
may be regarded as against the interests of justice and the victim. Therefore, the 
second relevant legal context relates to the judicial discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence. 
In those jurisdictions where the Uniform Evidence Act applies,30 for example, 
s 138 provides for the exclusion of ‘improperly or illegally obtained evidence’. 
Section 138(2)(a) states that an admission made during questioning is taken to 
be obtained improperly where the person conducting the questioning knew or 
should have known that the interview was conducted in circumstances which 
were ‘likely to impair substantially the ability of the person being questioned 
to respond rationally to the questioning’. In other jurisdictions, comparable 
27 See Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 423; Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 117(1)(k); Police Administration Act (NT) s 138(q)(ii); Criminal 
Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 (Tas) s 4(4)(j); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23C(7)(e) 
(applicable to Commonwealth offences and ACT offences that are ‘punishable by imprisonment for a 
period exceeding 12 months’ (s 23A(6)).
28 Some jurisdictions have enacted legislation to regulate post-arrest detention and questioning without 
expressly identifying intoxication as a relevant factor: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464A; Criminal 
Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 140. South Australia has a specific regime for ‘interviewing suspects 
with complex communication needs’ (Summary Offences Regulations 2016 (SA) pt 4) but this 
category expressly excludes communication difficulties caused by intoxication (cl 18(2)).
29 Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316, 322; McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501, 507; R v Lee 
(1950) 82 CLR 133, 144; R v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188, 192.
30 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); ACT; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 
2008 (Vic).
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legislation or the common law (or a combination of the two) operate to similar 
effect.31
Although the issue of police interviewing of intoxicated suspects arose in our 
data-set relatively rarely, the available evidence shows that a significant proportion 
of individuals in police custody after arrest are under the influence of alcohol or 
other drugs.32 Therefore, we consider that it is worth considering the guidance 
offered by appellate courts on this matter, because of its potential relevance to 
police practice in relation to suspects apprehended and detained by police when 
intoxicated. 
In NSW, express guidance is provided by the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) regime for determining the time allowed for 
questioning a suspect. Section 117(1)(k) provides that ‘any time that is required 
to allow the person to recover from the effects of intoxication due to alcohol or 
another drug or a combination of drugs’ is not to count for the purpose of the rules 
governing the period for which a suspect may be detained for questioning.33 In 
the cases we reviewed, such provisions appear to generally operate as a barrier 
to questioning an intoxicated person. For example, in Adzioski v The Queen,34 
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal noted that police had delayed 
interviewing the suspect due to his level of intoxication, and gave him time to 
recover before undertaking an electronically recorded interview with him.35
However, this was not universally so. In R v Martin,36 the Queensland Court of 
Appeal considered the admissibility of a police interview with a suspect in light of 
that State’s equivalent legislation on not questioning an intoxicated suspect,37 as 
well as the rules governing the exercise of judicial discretion to admit evidence.38 
Based on a sample taken several hours later it was estimated by a government 
medical officer that the offender’s Blood Alcohol Concentration (‘BAC’) when 
he was first interviewed by the police at the scene was approximately 0.311. On 
appeal, the defendant argued that evidence obtained during this interview should 
have been excluded for non-compliance with these provisions. The Queensland 
Court of Appeal did not uphold this ground of appeal, deferring to the trial 
judge’s discretion to admit the evidence. However, McMurdo P underscored the 
importance of requiring police officers to comply with their obligations under the 
Act:
31 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34KD; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 130; R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321; R v 
Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159; Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 82 ALR 10.
32 Sarah Coghlan et al, ‘Drug Use Monitoring in Australia: 2013–14 Report on Drug Use Among Police 
Detainees’ (AIC Monitoring Report No 27, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2015).
33 See also Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 423; Police Administration Act (NT) 
s 138(q)(ii); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23C(7)(e).
34 [2013] NSWCCA 69 (5 April 2013).
35 Ibid [10]. See also Butters v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 1 (4 February 2010) [7].
36 [2011] QCA 342 (29 November 2011).
37 Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 423.
38 R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321.
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Many judges may well have concluded that matters of public policy requiring 
police officers to comply with their responsibilities under the Act warranted the 
exclusion of the contentious evidence in this case, lest police officers be tempted to 
flaunt the requirements of the Act by taking investigative shortcuts. Further, a jury 
may place undue weight on the evidence without giving sufficient consideration 
to its unreliability as evidence of the appellant’s true state of mind at the time of 
the killing because of his gross intoxication at the time of the conversation. Had 
the decision at first instance been mine, I would have excluded the evidence for 
these reasons.
But I remain unpersuaded that the judge took into account any wrong consideration 
in exercising his discretion to admit this evidence.39
In Western Australia, where no such legislation is in place,40 the common law 
test of ‘voluntariness’, and the common law rules governing the admissibility 
of evidence,41 appears to leave considerable scope for statements made during a 
police interview to be regarded as admissible, despite evidence that the accused 
was significantly intoxicated at the time of the interview. For example, in Western 
Australia v Silich,42 the accused was interviewed at a time when his BAC was 
estimated to be 0.116. The WA Court of Appeal observed that, ‘[h]owever, there 
was no evidence as to the effect which such a level of alcohol would have had upon 
the appellant’s mental faculties at the time of his interview’.43 The Court endorsed 
the trial judge’s preferred approach which was to watch the police interview video 
and make his own assessment as to whether the interview was ‘voluntary’; i.e. 
whether Mr Silich was ‘capable of: (a) appreciating that he had a choice to speak 
or remain silent, and was capable of exercising sufficient volition to give effect to 
what he knew was this right; and (b) understanding the questions put to him and 
what he was confessing’.44 The trial judge held that the accused was capable and 
admitted the evidence. The Court of Appeal found no fault with this approach to 
voluntariness and did not accept arguments that the evidence ought to have been 
excluded for being unreliable or unfairly obtained.45 
This example illustrates that while we have become accustomed, in the high 
visibility and high-volume context of driving offences, to regard certain BAC 
levels as incontrovertible ‘proof’ of (impaired) ‘intoxication’ for the purposes of 
criminal responsibility and punishment, they are not determinative (and may not 
39 R v Martin [2011] QCA 342 (29 November 2011) [24]–[25].
40 No specific legislation in relation to intoxicated suspects and police interviews has been enacted 
in Western Australia, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia or the Australian Capital Territory. We 
recognise that equivalent police practices may be adopted even in the absence of such legislation: see, 
eg, Booth v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 38 (22 August 2014) [22]; R v Williams [2014] ACTCA 30 (18 
August 2014) [7].
41 R v Swaffield (1988) 192 CLR 159; Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 82 ALR 10.
42 (2011) 43 WAR 285.
43 Ibid [15].
44 Ibid [157].
45 See also WP v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 198 (22 September 2011); Wright v Western Australia 
(2010) 43 WAR 1; Oubid v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 79 (21 March 2013).
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be available) in many criminal justice decision-making contexts. We consider this 
matter further below.46  
B   Victim Intoxication in Sexual Assault Cases
While the most common focus of Australian criminal law is accused/offender 
intoxication, victim intoxication also features prominently, particularly in the 
context of sexual offences. Our data-set contained a number of instances where 
the court was concerned with the significance of the victim’s intoxication. The 
vast majority of these were sexual assault or indecent assault matters and included 
28 instances where the credibility and/or reliability of the victim was considered. 
We note that no other offence category revealed such a pattern of concern for 
the credibility/reliability implications of the victim’s intoxication. In addition, 
there were 19 instances where victim intoxication was considered in relation to 
proof of non-consent, and 21 instances where the court considered whether the 
victim’s intoxication (and, therefore, vulnerability), was an aggravating factor at 
sentencing.
In the discussion that follows, we draw attention to three issues where we 
detected considerable variation in how courts approach evidence of complainant 
intoxication:
(i) assessments of the credibility,47 and reliability,48 of the complainant’s 
evidence;
(ii) proof of non-consent; and
(iii) proof of the offender’s knowledge of non-consent.
On the question of credibility and reliability, there is consistent recognition 
that intoxication is relevant. This finding was anticipated. More surprising was 
the finding of considerable variation in how courts characterised the effect of 
intoxication on credibility/reliability. Some decisions reflect the view that 
intoxication will necessarily diminish the reliability of a complainant’s evidence.49 
By contrast, in others, courts have taken the position that the complainant’s 
intoxication may render her/his account more reliable, by offering an explanation 
other than dishonesty for gaps in the complainant’s recall or inconsistencies 
46 See Quilter et al, ‘Criminal Law and the Effects of Alcohol and Other Drugs’, above n 7; Quilter and 
McNamara, above n 19.
47 The cases in our data-set were concerned with qualitative assessments of a complainant’s credibility, 
rather than technical applications of the rules governing the admissibility of credibility evidence (eg 
pt 3.7 of the Uniform Evidence Act). 
48 Although s 165 of the Uniform Evidence Act, dealing with unreliable evidence and warnings to the 
jury, makes no express reference to intoxication or AOD effects, s 165(1)(c) is sufficiently broad in 
its terms (‘evidence the reliability of which may be affected by age, ill health (whether physical or 
mental), injury or the like’) as to include intoxication. See, eg, R v Moffatt [No 3] [1999] NSWSC 233 
(26 March 1999) [80].
49 See, eg, Roberts v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 452, [52]; Cook v Western Australia [2010] 
WASCA 241 (22 December 2010) [68]; R v Daniel (2010) 207 A Crim R 449, [50].
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in her/his account of events, thereby strengthening the prosecution case.50 The 
variations to which we are drawing attention here are not simply attributable to 
case-to-case factual differences, but appear to be the result of different judicial 
conceptions of how alcohol and other drugs may impact on perception and 
recall of events. Two decisions of the South Australia Court of Criminal Appeal 
illustrate the contrast. 
In R v Daniel,51 the Court upheld an appeal against a conviction for rape. One of 
the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge had erred in directing the jury on 
the relevance of the complainant’s intoxication. Justice Sulan stated:
In my view, the direction failed to adequately instruct the jury that, in considering 
the reliability of the complainant’s evidence, and whether they could be satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt upon her evidence, her state of 
intoxication was relevant. It was relevant to her perception, and to her recall of the 
events. It was also relevant, when considering her credibility.
In restricting his direction to the question of whether the complainant might 
have lost her inhibitions, but has now forgotten, or is now unwilling to admit her 
conduct, the trial judge failed to give a sufficient direction about the relevance of 
the complainant’s state of intoxication.52
In R v Compton,53 the Court considered appeals against convictions for the rape of 
a 14-year-old boy. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the convictions 
were unsafe and unsatisfactory given factors said to diminish the complainant’s 
reliability and credibility, including his intoxication.54 Justice Stanley said:
In my view, the issues surrounding the reliability of the complainant’s evidence 
were not sufficient to preclude satisfaction of the appellants’ guilt to the requisite 
standard. They were matters to be considered in assessing whether the charges 
had been proved to the requisite standard, but did not per se, preclude a finding of 
guilt. Further, the inconsistencies identified on the evidence could all be explained 
by the complainant’s youth, intoxication at the time, sense of shame, his fear of 
not being believed, and the nature of the ordeal he had endured as a teenage boy 
of 14 years of age.55
On the question of proof of non-consent, most Australian jurisdictions have 
enacted provisions which expressly identify victim intoxication as a condition 
that vitiates or may vitiate consent.56 Such provisions recognise that in some 
circumstances a complainant may not have the capacity to freely and voluntarily 
50 See, eg, R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177, [159]–[162]; Bray v The Queen (2014) 46 VR 623; 
R v O’Loughlin [2011] QCA 123 (10 June 2011) [18].
51 (2010) 207 A Crim R 449.
52 Ibid [50]–[51].
53 R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177.
54 The appeals were upheld on another ground.
55 R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177, [162] (emphasis added).
56 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(6)(a); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 34C(2)(e); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) 
s 67(1)(e); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 2A(2)(h); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 192(2)(c); Criminal 
Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 46(3)(d). No such provisions have been enacted in Queensland or 
Western Australia; however, as will be discussed here, it is not obvious that complainant intoxication 
evidence has a markedly different impact on the conduct of rape trials in these states. 
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consent due to her/his intoxicated state. They may also be said to operate to 
address a range of stereotypes including those of jurors, demonstrated in mock 
jury studies, in which jurors are more likely to attribute greater responsibility 
and blameworthiness to complainants who are intoxicated.57 In relation to the 
offender’s knowledge of non-consent, each Australian jurisdiction has imposed 
either complete or partial limits on whether offender intoxication can be taken 
into account either as a result of either specific provisions governing the mens rea 
for sexual assault,58 or general rules which exclude the intoxication ‘defence’59 in 
cases of ‘general intent’ crimes (a category that includes sexual assault).60 
On the implications of victim intoxication for proof of non-consent and the 
accused’s knowledge of non-consent, we detected a degree of divergence in attitude 
and approach in the cases in our data-set. Certainly, in some cases, the judicial 
approach seemed to reflect the policy reflected in the statutory provisions just 
mentioned.61 For example, in Still v The Queen,62 the complainant’s intoxication 
was seen as supporting the Crown’s ability to prove non-consent:
The complainant was heavily affected by alcohol, incoherent in her speech shortly 
before entering the taxi and probably bordering upon being comatose. These were 
significant aspects bearing upon the giving of consent to sexual activity with the 
Appellant, who was a complete stranger.63
However, surprisingly, and sometimes despite the legislative provisions that are 
underpinned by a contrary policy purpose,64 some cases appeared to validate 
the position that a person can be both extremely intoxicated and nonetheless 
consenting to sexual intercourse, even in the face of her/his claim that s/he was 
not consenting. In Mitic v The Queen the Victorian Court of Appeal endorsed 
the following passage from the Queensland Court of Appeal’s decision in R v 
Francis:
It is not correct as a matter of law that it is rape to have [sexual intercourse with] 
a woman who is drunk who does not resist because her submission is due to the 
fact that she is drunk. The reason why it is not is that that at least includes the 
case where the [intercourse] is consensual notwithstanding that the consent is 
induced by excessive consumption of alcohol. The critical question in this case 
57 See, eg, Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro, ‘Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases 
Involving Intoxicants: The Findings of a Pilot Study’ (2005) 45 British Journal of Criminology 25. 
Studies have also found that police and prosecutorial discretion are likely to be exercised against 
proceeding where the complainant has been drinking or using drugs: Statewide Steering Committee 
to Reduce Sexual Assault, ‘Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000–2003’ (Summary Research 
Report, Office of Women’s Policy, Department for Victorian Communities, July 2006) [119].
58 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(3)(e); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 37H(1)(a).
59 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 11A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) pt 8; Criminal Code Act 
1899 (Qld) s 28; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 28; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) 
ch 2 pt 2.3 div 2.3.3; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) pt IIAA div 3 sub-div 2; Criminal Code Act 1924 
(Tas) s 17; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 2.3 div 8.
60 On the specific/general intent distinction, see above n 4.
61 See, eg, R v Simon [2010] VSCA 66 (31 March 2010) [23]; Still v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 131 (23 
June 2010); Singh v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 262 (11 December 2012).
62 [2010] NSWCCA 131 (23 June 2010).
63 Ibid [66]. 
64 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(3)(e); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 37H(1)(a).
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was whether the complainant had, by reason of sleep or a drunken stupor, been 
rendered incapable of deciding whether to consent or not.65
Such an approach is also reflected in the recommended direction in the New South 
Wales Criminal Court Bench Book:
In considering whether the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt that 
[the complainant] did not consent you may have regard to the following matters if 
you have found them proved on the evidence before you:
[T]hat the complainant had sexual intercourse while substantially intoxicated by 
alcohol or any drug …
It does not follow simply because you find that fact proved that you should be 
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent, but it is a 
relevant fact that you should consider in deciding whether the Crown has proved 
this element [non-consent] of the offence as it must do so before you can convict 
the accused.
If the Crown fails to prove that the complainant was not consenting, the accused 
is “not guilty” of this charge.66
It is clear, then, that the statutory guidance that is offered in most Australian 
jurisdictions has not produced a consistent practice of treating complainant 
intoxication as synonymous with the absence of consent. It might be said that this 
is unsurprising given the qualified language of relevant legislative provisions. For 
example, s 61HA(6)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) states that ‘[t]he grounds on 
which it may be established that a person does not consent to sexual intercourse 
include: (a) if the person has sexual intercourse while substantially intoxicated 
by alcohol or any drug’.67 If a person who is ‘substantially intoxicated’ (we will 
return directly to the question of what this phrase means) can nonetheless be 
found to have consented, it is appropriate to ask whether such provisions have any 
effect on the conduct of a sexual assault trial or the nature of the inquiries therein. 
There may be said to be symbolic and educational benefits in such legislation 
— for judges, juries and the wider community. However, the manner in which 
they have been drafted and interpreted means that the central inquiry in rape/
sexual assault trials is whether the Crown has established an absence of ‘free 
and voluntary’ consent or agreement.68 It is not obvious that the Crown derives 
any significant benefit from statutory provisions that address victim intoxication. 
65 R v Francis [1993] 2 Qd R 300, 305, cited in Mitic v The Queen [2011] VSCA 373 (30 November 2011) 
[24]; See also Jones v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 117 (4 June 2010).
66 Judicial Commission of New South Wales, ‘Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book’ (Bench Book, 
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, October 2002) [5–1566] <https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.
au/publications/benchbks/criminal/sexual_intercourse_without_consent.html#p5-1566>.
67 (Emphasis added). Note that this provision that provides that intoxication ‘may’ vitiate consent can 
be contrasted with the unequivocal language of s 61HA(4)(b) dealing with a complainant who is 
unconscious or asleep: ‘A person does not consent to sexual intercourse … if the person does not 
have the opportunity to consent to the sexual intercourse because the person is unconscious or asleep’ 
(emphasis added).
68 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(2); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 34C(1); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) 
s 67(1); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 2A(1); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 192(1); Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 46(2); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 348(1); Criminal Code Act 
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 319(2)(a).
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Indeed, to the extent that they encourage complainant candour and disclosure 
about their intoxication — on the basis that this evidence will assist in proving at 
least one element of the prosecution case (i.e. non-consent) — such evidence also 
has the potential to weaken the Crown case by providing the defence with a basis 
on which to impugn the complainant’s reliability or credibility. This is one of the 
ways in which evidence of complainant intoxication may be said to be a double-
edged sword in sexual assault cases. We expand on this characterisation below.
One of the further findings of our case analysis relates to the failure to define the 
state of intoxication required to ‘trigger’ provisions such as those contained in 
s 61HA(6)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (consent may be negated where the 
person is ‘substantially intoxicated by alcohol or drugs’). There is no definition 
of ‘intoxicated’ — let alone ‘substantially intoxicated’ — for the purposes of this 
section. In the cases reviewed, the available evidence of the victim’s intoxication 
was often limited. It was rare for a BAC reading or expert evidence on the likely 
effects of AOD consumption to be available. Intoxication evidence often took the 
form of the victim’s self-report on how much s/he had consumed and/or how s/he 
recalled feeling at the time of the offence. 
Understandably, sexual assault victims often used imprecise colloquial language 
to convey their degree of intoxication. The following examples are illustrative:69 
•   ‘pretty drunk’;70
•   ‘starting to feel out of it’, ‘never felt that drunk before in [her] life’;71 
•   ‘when asked to describe how intoxicated she was on a scale of 1 to 10, she 
described herself as being a 10’;72
•   ‘She described herself as being “quite merry”, but not so much so as to have 
an impaired memory of what happened’;73
•   ‘She said at this stage she was still “very drunk” and on a scale of one to ten 
she estimated she was at about eight to nine’;74
•   ‘In evidence she said that, by this time, she had drunk between five and eight 
cans of a mixed alcohol drink and was “a bit drunk”’;75
•   ‘pretty drunk’, ‘definitely tipsy drunk’, ‘extremely drunk’;76
•   ‘very stoned’ [marijuana];77
69 See also Quilter and McNamara, above n 19.
70 Roberts v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 452, [6].
71 Amato v The Queen [2013] VSCA 346 (3 December 2013) [22].
72 R v Almotared [2011] QCA 128 (17 June 2011) [11].
73 R v O’Loughlin [2011] QCA 123 (10 June 2011) [3].
74 Jones v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 117 (4 June 2010) [16].
75 DPP (Vic) v Werry (2012) 37 VR 524, 527 [9].
76 R v McGuire [2013] QCA 290 (4 October 2013) [2]–[3], [6]. 
77 R v Elomari [2012] QCA 27 (28 February 2012) [5].
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•   ‘When asked to describe how intoxicated she was out of 10, she replied 
“nine”’;78
•   ‘I was very drunk and tired’.79
Given the imprecise and subjective colloquial nature of these expressions to 
describe both the presence and extent of intoxication, a significant issue arises as 
to how such terms and descriptions are translated into legal significance, so as 
to contribute to the resolution of important questions such as consent, reliability 
and credibility.
Elsewhere,80 employing a theoretical framework drawn from the work of Mariana 
Valverde,81 and Arlie Loughnan,82 we have argued that juries are frequently 
directed by judges (and legal practitioners) to draw on ‘common knowledge’ or 
‘lay knowledge’ about AOD in order to give meaning to the legal concept of 
intoxication. We have questioned whether this is an appropriate foundation for 
making decisions about complex cognitive functions of the sort that tribunals 
are regularly required to make — like intention formation where the accused 
was intoxicated at the time of the commission of a serious violent crime, or, 
for present purposes, like the giving of consent to sexual intercourse where the 
complainant was intoxicated.
In the context of sexual assault trials where consent is in issue, an additional 
reason why self-reporting and lay conceptions of intoxication are operative and 
influential is that there may be a gap between what is understood about the effects 
of alcohol and other drugs — even by scientific experts — and the question to be 
answered regarding consent. The point is illustrated by one of the rare cases in 
our data-set in which there was ‘objective’ evidence of the complainant’s level of 
intoxication:83
The highest the remaining evidence went was that the complainant was significantly 
drunk at the time of intercourse, possibly with a blood-alcohol concentration as 
high as between 0.165% and .2%, and stumbling and repeating her speech. But, as 
Dr Odell said, he could not venture an opinion as to whether that had deprived the 
complainant of the capacity to consent.84 
It is clear that, despite decades of well-intentioned progressive statutory law 
reform (including on the relevance to be attached to intoxication),85 evidence of 
victim intoxication can (still) be a double-edged sword in sexual assault cases. 
78 Cook v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 241 (22 December 2010) [23].
79 O’Rafferty v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 35 (21 August 2014) [16].
80 Quilter and McNamara, above n 19.
81 Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2003).
82 Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
2012).
83 Mitic v The Queen [2011] VSCA 373 (30 November 2011).
84 Ibid [24].
85 Kathleen Daly and Brigitte Bouhours, ‘Rape and Attrition in the Legal Process: A Comparative 
Analysis of Five Countries’ (2010) 39 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 565; Julia Quilter, 
‘Re-Framing the Rape Trial: Insights from Critical Theory About the Limitations of Legislative 
Reform’ (2011) 35 Australian Feminist Law Journal 23.
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On the one hand, legislative provisions expressly identify intoxication as a factor 
that may suggest the absence of consent, and as evidence which may support 
the Crown’s case. On the other hand, the same evidence can be relied upon by 
the defence in a number of ways: to raise doubt about the victim’s reliability and 
credibility, or in support of an assertion that the accused honestly and reasonably 
believed that the complainant was consenting.
The challenges associated with the justice system’s approach to victim 
intoxication need to be addressed sensitively. The inappropriateness of being 
overly proscriptive and imposing on victims of sexual assault a ‘test’ of 
intoxication that they must ‘pass’ is obvious. The conundrum to which we have 
drawn attention cannot be resolved merely by offering a statutory definition of 
intoxication (however much drafters aim for context-sensitivity); but the status 
quo, where victim intoxication is often evidenced via self-report, articulated in 
(value-laden) lay terms and filtered by the attitudes of judges and juries, leaves 
victims unduly vulnerable to adverse judgment.86 Related to the more general 
point that relying on ‘common knowledge’ to define intoxication for criminal law 
purposes is problematic,87 here we emphasise that resort to ‘what we all know’ 
is especially problematic in sexual assault trials, given the long and entrenched 
history of stereotypes about rape complainants.88
C  The Intoxication ‘Defence’89
The most familiar way in which intoxication evidence can be raised in relation 
to criminal responsibility, which has been well examined in the textbooks and 
the scholarly literature,90 is where the evidence is relied on by an accused for the 
purpose of disputing the Crown’s ability to prove a core element of the offence 
(eg intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm on a charge of murder). In all 
Australian jurisdictions,91 apart from Victoria,92 this option has been limited93 to 
86 Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro, ‘Intoxicated Consent and the Boundaries of Drug-assisted Rape’ 
[2003] Criminal Law Review 773; Finch and Munro, above n 57; Andrea Flynn and Kathryn Graham, 
‘“Why Did It Happen?” A Review and Conceptual Framework for Research on Perpetrators’ and 
Victims’ Explanations for Intimate Partner Violence’ (2010) 15 Aggression and Violent Behavior 239.
87 Quilter and McNamara, above n 19.
88 See Julia Quilter, ‘From Raptus to Rape: A History of the “Requirements” of Resistance and Injury’ 
(2015) 2 Law & History 89; Quilter, ‘Re-Framing the Rape Trial’, above n 85.
89 We have made no attempt to estimate the frequency with which intoxication evidence is employed 
as part of a defence strategy (or the success rate of such approaches) because our data-set could 
not support such analysis (noting that a defendant who has successfully relied on an intoxication 
‘defence’ at trial is relatively unlikely to be appealing to a higher court).
90 See above n 2–3.
91 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 11A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) pt 8; Criminal Code 
Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 28; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 28; Criminal Code Act 
2002 (ACT) pt 2.3 div 2.3.3; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) pt IIAA div 3 sub-div 2; Criminal Code 
Act 1924 (Tas) s 17; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 2.3 div 8.
92 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; Law Reform Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Criminal Liability 
for Self-Induced Intoxication, Report (May 1999).
93 These restrictions do not apply to ‘involuntary’ intoxication (see generally, Bronitt and McSherry, 
above n 3, 299–300) which, as our current data-set confirms, feature very rarely in the decided cases.
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crimes that have a specific intent component — i.e. where the offence definition 
requires the Crown to prove as an element of the offence that the accused intended 
to bring about a particular consequence.94 While these rules are colloquially 
referred to as the intoxication ‘defence’, it is appropriate to note that, even if 
successful, such reliance on intoxication evidence is likely to result in conviction 
for a lesser (general intent) crime, rather than acquittal.95 
One of the insights supported by the cases in our data-set is that this familiar 
context is only one of several ways in which intoxication evidence may impact 
on assessments of criminal responsibility. Moreover, contrary to the views that 
circulate periodically in media accounts and political discourse,96 intoxication 
evidence is as likely to increase the prospect of a conviction as to provide the 
accused with a basis for ‘getting off’. We will elaborate on the strategic risk posed 
by reliance on intoxication evidence in the discussion that follows. 
The diversity we have found includes where intoxication is:
•   asserted as relevant to whether the accused had another form of subjective 
mens rea — such as awareness of what a joint enterprise participant was doing 
or intending;97 
•   asserted by a defendant to support the subjective test component of another 
defence, such as provocation,98 self-defence,99 or mistake of fact;100
•   counter-intuitively, asserted by the Crown to strengthen (not weaken) the 
prosecution’s assertion that the defendant acted with the requisite intent;101 and
94 The distinction was endorsed by the House of Lords in DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, and although 
it was rejected by the High Court of Australia in R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, legislatures 
have modified the Australian common law position. The veracity of the general intent/specific 
intent distinction as an appropriate basis for determining the availability of exculpatory intoxication 
evidence has been questioned: see, eg, Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, Intoxication and Criminal 
Responsibility, Final Report No 7 (August 2006) 46; above n 4.
95 See, eg, R v Harold [2010] QCA 267 (8 October 2010).
96 See, eg, Bronnit and McSherry, above n 3, 285–6; Brown, above n 24, 217–22.
97 See, eg, Ulutui v The Queen (2014) 41 VR 676; R v Heyward & Minter [2010] SASCFC 38 (28 
September 2010); Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31.
98 See, eg, R v Lindsay (2014) 119 SASR 320.
99 See, eg, Dal Cortivo v The Queen (2010) 204 A Crim R 55.
100 See, eg, Commissioner of Police v Stehbens [2013] QCA 81 (16 April 2013); Prazmo v Western 
Australia [No 2] [2010] WASCA 99 (25 May 2010).
101 See, eg, in Ward v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 46 (1 March 2013) [82], the trial judge directed the 
jury that: ‘You can have an intoxicated intention. You can have an intention that is based on alcohol 
and drugs. In fact, very often, unfortunately, the situation is that a person forms a certain intention 
because they are intoxicated and they would no [sic] not have formed it if they were not.’ See also R v 
Barden [2010] QCA 374 (23 December 2010); Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31.
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•   asserted by the Crown to foreclose access to a defence (noting that legislation 
defining some defences expressly excludes reliance on intoxication 
evidence102).103   
It is important to recognise that the accused does not control whether intoxication 
is in issue. Trial judges have an obligation to put intoxication evidence to the 
jury even if not asserted by the defendant if the judge considers that there is 
sufficient evidence that intoxication may be relevant to a matter that goes to the 
guilty/not guilty decision.104 This may be an outcome that a defendant has actively 
attempted to avoid for strategic reasons, such as inconsistency with their main 
line of defence (eg diminished responsibility/substantial impairment or ‘insanity’/
mental illness)105 or out of a concern that they may be judged harshly because of 
the stigma associated with excessive alcohol consumption (or the consumption of 
illicit drugs) or regarded as unreliable or lacking in credibility.
The cases in our data-set show that an accused faces a significant ‘strategic risk’ 
if evidence of her/his intoxication is before the court. This matter has been the 
subject of judicial comment,106 and an influence on defence practice, but it has 
rarely been discussed or documented in the literature.107 One common form 
of strategic risk we identified in the cases we reviewed is illustrated by the 
Queensland case of Stehbens,108 in which the accused was charged with assaulting 
a police officer. She gave evidence of her intoxication to support her defence of 
mistake under s 24 of the Criminal Code (Qld): that is, that she did not realise the 
person she hit was a police officer. She was convicted at first instance, appealed 
successfully to the District Court, but this decision was reversed by the Court of 
Appeal and the conviction restored. The Court endorsed the Magistrate’s adverse 
assessment of the defendant’s reliability given her ‘alcohol consumption and her 
admitted state of mind at the time the alleged offence took place’.109
102 In some jurisdictions, legislation provides that an accused person is precluded from relying on certain 
defences if they were intoxicated at the time of the alleged commission of the offence: eg, the defence 
of insanity in the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 28 and the Criminal Code Act 1899 
(Qld) s 28, the partial defence of extreme provocation in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 23 and the 
partial defence of diminished responsibility in Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 159(3).
103 Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297; MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305, 309 [16]; R v Stanley [2013] 
NSWCCA 124 (28 May 2013); R v Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91 (13 August 2014).
104 See, eg, SW v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 103 (7 June 2013); R v George [2014] 2 QD R 150; R v 
Barden [2010] QCA 374 (23 December 2010); Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31.
105 Ibid. The case of R v Logan [2012] QCA 210 (17 August 2012) is illustrative. The accused sought to 
play down his level of intoxication in a context where he sought to rely on the defence of insanity 
(Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 27) or the partial defence of diminished responsibility (Criminal 
Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 304A). After initially indicating that he was intoxicated at the time of the 
conduct in question, he later resiled (‘probably [became] aware that it would not be helpful’ ([73])). 
By contrast, the prosecution drew attention to the accused’s alleged intoxication and asserted that he 
had ‘killed in an intoxicated frenzy’ ([2]). 
106 R v Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127, 138 (Gleeson CJ).
107 The matter is discussed briefly in Brown et al, above n 24, 881; and Colvin et al, above n 3, 444.
108 Commissioner of Police v Stehbens [2013] QCA 81 (16 April 2013).
109 Ibid [43].
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The South Australian case of Stott provides a further illustration.110 The Full Court 
ruled that the trial judge had been correct to direct the jury that the accused’s 
intoxication was simultaneously relevant to the question of whether the accused 
foresaw the risk associated with his driving behaviour and his credibility and 
reliability as a witness. The trial judge’s direction is worth extracting at some 
length to make the point:
Mr Stott’s intoxication, if you find that he was intoxicated, may affect your 
deliberations in a number of ways. … His intoxication is relevant in considering 
whether he had the intention which I have told you is an ingredient of the various 
charges, or whether he was reckless in the way that I have explained to you. The 
inferences about intention and recklessness which may be drawn in the case of 
a sober person from his actions may not be as readily drawn in the case of an 
intoxicated person. … So when you are considering with what intention or state 
of mind the accused acted, you will bear in mind the effect, if any, of the influence 
of alcohol upon his mind. As I have mentioned, you will bear in mind intoxication 
when considering both intention and recklessness. ... Mr Stott’s intoxication at the 
time may also affect your estimate of his credibility and reliability as a witness 
here in the witness box. It may also affect your assessment of the accuracy of his 
perception at the time the events were occurring.111
In a further and more surprising twist on the notion of intoxication-as-strategic 
risk (that is, surprising when compared with the popular conception of the so-
called ‘drunk’s defence’), we identified a number of cases in our data-set in which 
trial judges and appellate courts endorsed the Crown’s adoption of an approach 
which relied on evidence of the accused’s intoxication to strengthen (not weaken) 
the assertion that the Defendant acted with the requisite intent.112 The case of Ward 
was the most striking example.113 The trial judge (whose approach was approved 
of by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal) effectively turned the 
intoxication ‘defence’ on its head by suggesting that the accused’s (multi-drug) 
intoxication could actually assist the jury to conclude that she had the requisite 
intent (when she ran the victim down with her car). Howie J said:
You can have an intoxicated intention. You can have an intention that is based on 
alcohol and drugs. In fact, very often, unfortunately, the situation is that a person 
forms a certain intention because they are intoxicated and they would no [sic] not 
have formed it if they were not. …
You have a specific intention to do something, even though you are intoxicated. 
That may be the reason why you have that intention. You have heard some 
evidence about the disinhibiting effect of alcohol. How sometimes people will do 
110 R v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346.
111 Ibid 353–4 [20].
112 Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297; MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305, 309 [16]; Ward v The 
Queen [2013] NSWCCA 46 (1 March 2013); R v Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91 (13 August 2014).
113 Ward v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 46 (1 March 2013).
Evidence of Intoxication in Australian Criminal Courts: A Complex Variable with Multiple 
Effects
173
things, form intentions, carry out actions they wouldn’t do if they were stone cold 
and so on.114
A variation on this approach was evident in Hothnyang.115 The Victorian Court 
of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s distinction between: intoxication that makes 
a person unable to form intent; and intoxication that disinhibits a person, and 
makes him/her ‘unable to resist the temptation to [intentionally] kill or inflict 
really serious injury’.116
Another variation was apparent in Stanley,117 a case in which the question of 
whether the accused’s intoxication raised a reasonable doubt about whether he 
had the requisite specific intent. The Crown ‘conceded’ that the events in question 
(including the criminal offending) would not have happened but for the accused’s 
intoxication, but this was a concession designed to strengthen the prosecution 
case. The trial judge endorsed the Crown’s theory of intoxication’s causal role 
and observed that ‘specific intent can sometimes be formed by people who are in 
a terrible state of intoxication or whatever’.118
It is not our contention that there is anything inappropriate about the Crown’s 
strategic enlistment of intoxication evidence to support a conviction. However, 
the practice does provide a further illustration of one of our central arguments in 
this article: the relationship between evidence of AOD consumption and effects, 
criminal trial processes and the determination of criminal responsibility is much 
more complex than is commonly recognised in both the scholarly literature and 
the political discourse that frequently surrounds intoxication-focused criminal 
law reform proposals and debates. An important dimension of this complexity 
is the absence of any meaningful guidelines — legislative or judicial — on the 
point at which a person’s level of intoxication will be considered so high as to 
support a conclusion that there was reasonable doubt about whether she acted 
with a requisite specific intent. The cases in our data-set suggest that juries are 
regularly asked to make this complex assessment on the basis of their ‘common 
knowledge’ about AOD effects.119
It is appropriate to acknowledge that the Crown does not always ‘exploit’ the 
accused’s intoxication to achieve conviction. It is apparent that prosecutors will 
sometimes take intoxication into account in the plea negotiation process. For 
114 Ibid [82], [84]. See also R v Barden [2010] QCA 374 (23 December 2010) [7], where the trial judge 
told the jury that ‘[a] drunken intention is still an intention. If he had drunkenly formed the intention 
to do grievous bodily harm he is guilty of murder’; and Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31, 
40–1 [44] (‘drunken intention’).
115 Hothnyang v The Queen [2014] VSCA 64 (11 April 2014).
116 Ibid [45]. See also R v Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91 (13 August 2014) [32] where the Crown 
emphasised the impulsivity/disinhibition effects of the accused’s intoxication as a result of alcohol 
and methylamphetamine consumption.
117 R v Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124 (28 May 2013).
118 Ibid [17].
119 See, eg, R v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346, 353–4 [20]; Shepherd v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 245 (17 
November 2011) [192]; R v Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124 (28 May 2013) [60]; Babic v The Queen 
(2010) 28 VR 297, 320–1 [106]. The implications of reliance on ‘common knowledge’ as the reference 
point for understanding and applying the concept of intoxication as it relates to criminal responsibility 
are discussed more fully in Quilter and McNamara, above n 19. 
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example, in West,120 the defendant’s intoxication (and the challenge this posed 
for the Crown’s ability to prove the requisite intent beyond reasonable doubt) 
was identified by the Victorian Court of Appeal as a determinative factor in the 
Crown’s decision to accept pleas to recklessly causing serious injury (rather than 
intentionally causing serious injury).121
D  Sentencing122
The High Court has held that sentencing should be approached as a process of 
‘intuitive’ or ‘instinctive’ synthesis123 — language which is designed to convey 
that sentencing is a human (and not mechanical) decision-making process that 
must take account of all of the myriad factors that are relevant. It is a process 
which involves:
the exercise of a discretion controlled by judicial practice, appellate review, 
legislative indicators and public opinion. Statute, legal principle and community 
values all confine the scope in which instinct may operate.124 
In addition to the common law sentencing principles and purposes of punishment 
which have developed over time,125 legislatures in several jurisdictions have 
enacted statutory formulations of sentencing purposes and principles,126 
whether expressed as ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ factors,127 or relevant 
‘considerations’.128
NSW and Queensland are the only Australian jurisdictions in which (since 2014) 
courts have been given legislative guidance on the relevance of intoxication to 
sentencing — in the form of express statements that self-induced intoxication 
120 West v The Queen [2014] VSCA 36 (13 March 2014).
121 Ibid [31].
122 We have not set out to complete a fine-grained comparative study of Australia’s different sentencing 
regimes. We will focus on general patterns and commonalities when it comes to rules, principles and 
practices on the relevance of intoxication to sentencing, while also drawing attention to noteworthy 
variations and departures.
123 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357. For a critique of this approach to sentencing, see Mirko 
Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2016) 29–31.
124 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 390 [84]. 
125 Bugmy (2013) 249 CLR 571; Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; York v The Queen (2005) 
225 CLR 466; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 
CLR 465; R v Jackway; Ex parte Attorney-General [1997] 2 Qd R 277; R v Leach (1979) 1 A Crim R 
320; R v Morris (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 40; R v Radich [1954] NZLR 86; R v Ball (1951) 35 Cr App Rep 
164; R v McCowan [1931] St R Qd 149.
126 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1); Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(2); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7; Sentencing Act (NT) s 5.
127 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A; Sentencing Act (NT) s 6A; Sentencing Act 
1995 (WA) ss 7–8. Even in states where no comparable provisions have been enacted the courts 
recognise and apply aggravating and mitigating factors: see, eg, Daley v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 
10 (22 August 2016); Ashdown v The Queen (2011) 37 VR 341; R v KU; Ex parte Attorney-General 
(Qld) [No 2] [2011] 1 Qd R 439.
128 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 33–6; 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2).
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is a not a mitigating factor.129 In all other jurisdictions, common law sentencing 
principles inform the decision as to what significance, if any, should be attached 
to offender intoxication.130
A strong undercurrent in recent debates about how the criminal law should be 
reformed to better deter AOD-related violence131 is that the criminal justice 
system, and the sentencing process in particular, has been too ‘soft’ on violence 
associated with AOD consumption; that intoxication is too often treated as a 
basis for reducing an offender’s sentence rather than increasing it. Our review of 
sentencing appeal decisions handed down in the period 2010–2014 confirms that 
this is an inaccurate and too simplistic an account of the principles and practices 
that govern sentencing in cases where the accused was intoxicated. This finding 
provides further support for the central thesis advanced in this article regarding 
the complex relationship between intoxication and criminal court adjudication.
Not all Australian jurisdictions adopt the same starting point when it comes to 
the relevance of offender intoxication to the determination of a sentence.132 For 
example, in the Northern Territory, the Court of Criminal Appeal has observed 
that:
The courts have pointed out that the intoxication of an offender through the 
consumption of alcohol may constitute an aggravating factor or a mitigating factor 
depending upon the circumstances of the case. There is no general rule that such 
intoxication need be one or the other. In some circumstances it may be a neutral 
factor.133
By contrast, the starting point adopted by courts in some states is that there is a 
‘general rule’ that intoxication per se does not operate as a mitigating factor.134 For, 
example, in Hasan,135 the Victorian Court of Appeal asserted that: ‘courts around 
Australia have consistently rejected the proposition that intoxication can mitigate 
129 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(5AA), as amended by the Crimes and Other 
Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW); Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) s 9(9A), as amended by the Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld). Note 
that the cases in our date set were decided before these provisions came into force.
130 See generally, Bagaric and Edney, above n 123, 372–7.
131 A 2016 Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee Inquiry into the 
need for a nationally-consistent approach to alcohol-fuelled violence was asked to investigate inter 
alia, ‘whether a judicial commission in each state and territory would ensure consistency in judgments 
relating to alcohol-related violence in line with community standards’: Parliament of Australia, Need 
For a Nationally-Consistent Approach to Alcohol-Fuelled Violence, Parliament of Australia <http://
www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/
Alcohol_fuelled_violence>. In 2015 the New South Wales Sentencing Council was asked to consider 
a proposal that intoxication be treated as a mandatory aggravating factor for crimes of violence. The 
Council declined to endorse the proposal: New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Alcohol and Drug 
Fuelled Violence’, above n 5, 12–13. See also New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Sentencing for 
Alcohol-Related Violence’, above n 5.
132 Regarding recent changes in New South Wales and Queensland, see above n 129.
133 R v Wilson (2011) 30 NTLR 51, 62 [44]; see also Barron v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 114, 118–19 [17] 
where the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal found that intoxication had not been overlooked by 
the trial judge ‘in the plea [of] mitigation’.
134 See, eg, Western Australia v Hassell [2014] WASCA 158 (27 August 2014); Langdon v Kelemete-
Leoli-McLean (2011) 206 A Crim R 368.
135 Hasan v The Queen (2010) 31 VR 28.
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the seriousness of an offence or reduce the offender’s culpability’.136 Similarly 
in Hart,137 the Court of Appeal of Queensland stated ‘[t]he Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that intoxication cannot properly be regarded as a mitigating feature 
in cases of violent crime’.138 There was also some evidence of intra-jurisdictional 
variation during the periods under review. For example, in Stewart,139 the New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (Button J) stated:
As for the role of alcohol, it is well established that the intoxication of an offender at 
the time of the commission of an offence can be taken into account by a sentencing 
court: see R v Coleman (1990) 47 A Crim R 306. Whether intoxication is a matter 
of mitigation or aggravation will depend upon the facts of the particular case.140
In the same year, in GWM,141 a differently constituted New South Wales Court 
of Criminal Appeal endorsed the approach in Hasan and stated that ‘voluntary 
intoxication operates rarely (at best) to mitigate penalty’.142
It was not obvious that differences in starting point materially affected the way in 
which intoxication evidence was treated in specific instances. Across the country 
we identified four major circumstances in which intoxication is treated as an 
‘indirect’143 mitigating factor:
1. in support of characterisation of the offender’s conduct as ‘out of character’; 
2. in support of characterisation of the offender’s conduct as spontaneous/
unplanned;
3. where the offender’s AOD use and intoxication on the occasion in question is 
associated with dependency/addiction or other mental illness (or cognitive 
impairment); and
4. where the offender’s intoxication is located in a wider context of disadvantage, 
specifically, Indigenous community disadvantage.
More tentatively, given the ambiguous language often used by courts, we would 
add a fifth category: where intoxication is said to ‘explain’ (but not excuse) an 
offence.144 We suggest that where a sentencing or appellate court uses language 
that emphasises the role of intoxication in the offending behaviour (thereby 
‘explaining’ the offence) there is an implied reduction in the offender’s culpability. 
136 Ibid 33 [21].
137 R v Hart [2012] QCA 38 (6 March 2012).
138 Ibid [42].
139 Stewart v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 183 (29 August 2012).
140 Ibid [51] (Button J).
141 R v GWM [2012] NSWCCA 240 (21 November 2012).
142 Ibid [78] (Johnson J).
143 ‘Indirectly’ is our characterisation of how intoxication is impacting on sentencing in these cases. 
The effect is indirect to the extent that the courts are effectively asserting that intoxication per se is 
not a mitigating factor, but evidence that the accused was intoxicated may allow him/her to access a 
recognised mitigating factor (eg ‘out of character’ and ‘spontaneous/unplanned’).
144 See, eg, Bourke v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 38; Stewart v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 185 (9 
August 2013); R v Williams; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2014) 247 A Crim R 250; R v Wilson 
(2011) 30 NTLR 51; R v Taylor (2010) 203 A Crim R 302; Queensland Police Service v Terare (2014) 
245 A Crim R 211; R v Williams [2014] ACTCA 30 (18 August 2014).
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The logic appears to be that the person would not have offended if s/he had been 
sober, and that this is relevant to the determination of sentence. The following 
comments by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Williams are illustrative:
Where, as here, the evidence, such as it was, suggested that the respondent had 
used amphetamines for a limited period leading up to the offence and never 
thereafter then two related things follow. One is that it can be said that the impact 
of the drug explained the inexplicable — why a man with no previous conviction 
for violence of any sort over twenty-three years of adult life should behave so 
appallingly. Secondly, the prospect of the respondent re-offending is considerably 
less than if he suffered from an uncontrollable psychological disturbance of some 
kind.145
1  Mitigation: Out of Character
The starting point for understanding how intoxication can inform ‘out of character’ 
mitigation is that character has long been regarded as relevant to sentencing, and 
‘good’ character is generally recognised as a mitigating factor, both at common 
law,146 and in sentencing legislation.147 Although we detected a range of views 
about the breadth of this category, there was widespread recognition in the cases 
under review that one of the ways in which intoxication evidence can have a 
mitigatory effect is if it supports the characterisation of the offender’s conduct 
as ‘out of character’. The decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Simon is 
illustrative:148
Alcohol, though not a circumstance of mitigation, seems likely to explain the 
applicant’s behaviour on this occasion, which was quite out of character. Nothing 
in the applicant’s antecedents, his relationship with the complainant and H, or 
his minor criminal record, hinted that the applicant would offend in such a way; 
or, in my opinion, carried any implication that he would be likely to do so in the 
future.149
In the widely cited decision of Hasan the Victorian Court of Appeal, while 
conceding that ‘[a]n “out of character” exception is acknowledged to exist’, 
asserted ‘but it has almost never been applied’.150 Our review of appellate 
decisions handed down in the period 2010–2014 suggests that this somewhat 
understates the availability of this particular mode of intoxication-related indirect 
mitigation. Although it did not feature in large numbers in our data-set, appellate 
courts in three jurisdictions (including Victoria) recognised the out of character 
145 R v Williams; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2014) 247 A Crim R 250, 268 [95]; see also R v Wilson 
(2011) 30 NTLR 51, 61–2 [43]; R v Brown [2013] QCA 185 (16 July 2013) [11].
146 Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465.
147 See, eg, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6; Sentencing Act (NT) s 5; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW) s 21A(3)(f).
148 R v Simon [2010] VSCA 66 (31 March 2010).
149 Ibid [55].
150 Hasan v The Queen (2010) 31 VR 28, 33 [21]; see also R v GWM [2012] NSWCCA 240 (21 November 
2012).
Monash University Law Review (Vol 43, No 1)178
exception and endorsed its application to mitigate sentence during the period 
under review.151  
2  Mitigation: Spontaneous/Unplanned
That an occasion of criminal offending was planned or pre-meditated is generally 
regarded as an aggravating factor. This principle has been expressed in sentencing 
legislation in some jurisdictions,152 and is recognised at common law.153 The 
corollary is that a person who engages in ‘spontaneous’ criminal conduct is less 
culpable and that this should be a factor that mitigates the sentence.154 
Our data-set included a small number of cases in which appellate courts 
recognised that evidence that the accused was intoxicated at the time may support 
characterisation of the offence as spontaneous or unplanned, rather than planned 
or pre-meditated. The case of R v YS is illustrative:155
Despite the objective gravity of the offending in this case, his Honour was 
entitled to afford the respondent’s youth and immaturity considerable weight 
in the assessment of a just and proportionate sentence. In addition, his Honour 
made a further critical finding, namely that the respondent’s sexual offending was 
impulsive. That finding is not under challenge on the appeal. In my view, that 
finding, when coupled with the evidence which established that under intensive 
psychological assessment the respondent was shown to have a compromised 
capacity for reasoned judgment and empathy, an undeveloped capacity to control 
his impulsive behaviour and a reduced capacity for mature decision-making (no 
doubt aggravated by his state of intoxication at the time of the offending) was also 
entitled to significant weight in this sentencing exercise.156 
While this category of indirect intoxication-related mitigation is not limited to a 
particular type of offence, we did note that a number of the cases in our sample 
in which it was successfully invoked were sexual offences (including child sexual 
assault).157 The number of cases in our sample is too small to support generalised 
claims about sentencing patterns, but there appears to be an inconsistency that 
151 See, eg, R v Simon [2010] VSCA 66 (31 March 2010); Johnson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 360 (14 
November 2011); Chen v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 116 (22 May 2013); PDT v Western Australia 
[2012] WASCA 134 (20 June 2012) [25]; Kaschull v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 245 (29 
November 2012).
152 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)(n).
153 Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305, 314. For recent applications, see, eg, Western Australia v 
Malone [2015] WASCA 188 (16 September 2015) [76]; R v Ogilvie [2015] ACTSC 296 (9 September 
2015) [31]; R v NQ [2013] QCA 402 (20 December 2013) [14]; R v M, AG (2013) 116 SASR 219, 226 
[40].
154 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(3)(b).
155 [2014] NSWCCA 226 (23 October 2014).
156 Ibid [99]; see also MDZ v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 243 (15 November 2011) [65], [74]; BIP v The 
Queen [2011] NSWCCA 224 (14 October 2011) [64]; Barron v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 114, 118–9 
[17].
157 All of these cases were from New South Wales (noting that this State provided 28 per cent of the 
cases in our total data-set): R v YS [2014] NSWCCA 226 (23 October 2014); MDZ v The Queen [2011] 
NSWCCA 243 (15 November 2011); BIP v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 224 (14 October 2011); LB v 
The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 220 (7 October 2011).
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warrants further investigation in future research. The possible inconsistency to 
which we refer is between the suggestion that in the case of sexual offending 
(which typically occurs in private settings) intoxicated-related spontaneity may 
be mitigating, and the strong position articulated by the courts in recent years that 
when it comes to ‘street’ violence (i.e. public non-sexual violence) intoxicated-
related spontaneity should be treated as aggravating (discussed further below).
3  Mitigation: Mental Illness and Cognitive Impairment
That a person’s criminal offending occurred at a time when they were suffering 
from a mental illness, or cognitive impairment,158 is generally considered to be 
a mitigating factor, due to decreased moral culpability, and a reduced need for 
general deterrence.159 Because intoxication per se is generally not a mitigating 
factor, cases where both factors are present require the court to grapple with the 
complex relationship between mental illness, AOD use and criminal offending. A 
large number of the sentencing appeals in our data-set fall into this category. These 
cases revealed judicial recognition of five different versions of the intoxication/
mental illness relationship:
(i) A mental illness may have been exacerbated by AOD consumption;
(ii) A mental illness may have contributed to AOD use;
(iii) AOD use may have triggered the mental illness;
(iv) AOD dependence may constitute the diagnosed mental illness (eg alcohol 
use disorder); and
(v) AOD use may be a form of ‘self-medication’ for coping with the symptoms 
of a mental illness.
A range of mental illnesses were raised by the cases, including schizophrenia, 
depressive disorder, anxiety, attention deficit disorder, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, drug dependence disorder, borderline and dependent 
158 ‘Mental illness’ and ‘cognitive impairment’ are variously defined in a range of statutes relevant to 
criminal justice administration across Australian jurisdictions. See generally New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal Justice 
System: Diversion, Report No 135 (2012). Debate surrounds current approaches in some contexts; see, 
eg Arlie Loughnan, ‘Contemporary Comment: Reforming the Criminal Law on Mental Incapacity’ 
(2013) 25 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 703; Linda Steele, Leanne Dowse and Julian Trofimovs, 
‘Who is Diverted?: Moving Beyond Diagnosed Impairment Towards a Social and Political Analysis 
of Diversion’ (2016) 38 Sydney Law Review 179. However, definitional complexities were not a 
prominent feature of the sentencing cases in our data-set.
159 See, eg, R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; Lauritsen v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 442. Note, however, 
that sometimes the nexus between an offender’s mental illness and criminal offending is regarded as 
requiring the attribution of greater weight to specific deterrence and the need to protect the public: 
See, eg, Beldon v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 194 (6 September 2012) [64]. 
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personality disorder.160 Evidence of cognitive impairment was also present in a 
number of cases.161 
A recurring message in the appellate decisions we reviewed was that, although 
it is difficult to do so, the two factors of intoxication and mental illness must be 
‘disentangled’.162 The relationship between intoxication and cognitive impairment 
raised similar challenges.163 Although artificial in many respects (and perhaps 
impossible), the driver for this exercise, as noted above, is that mental illness 
and cognitive impairment are consistently regarded as mitigating factors whereas 
intoxication is generally not regarded as mitigating. 
It was evident from our analysis of the cases that judges struggle with the task of 
separating the offender’s intoxication from her/his mental illness and determining 
the role that each played in the offending behaviour. For example, in Adzioski v 
The Queen (where the offender suffered from schizophrenia),164 the Court said:
While the level of the applicant’s intoxication might provide a complete answer 
to the offending, his Honour regarded such a result as overly simplistic in that it 
might artificially deny the presence of the underlying mental health condition. His 
Honour concluded that the answer was likely to involve a synthesis of all of those 
factors.165 
A recurring ground of appeal was that the sentencing judge had placed too much 
weight on mental illness rather than attribute the behaviour to intoxication (i.e. in 
the context of a Crown appeal that the sentence was inadequate),166 or vice versa 
(in the context of a defence appeal against severity).167 For example, in Bennett v 
The Queen,168 the Victorian Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had 
attached too much significance to the offender’s alcohol use and intoxication and 
not enough to his mental illness (chronic anxiety and depression).169 In R v Ball,170 
160 See, eg, MDZ v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 243 (15 November 2011); George v The Queen [2013] 
NSWCCA 263 (12 November 2013); Papas v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 3 (10 January 2011).
161 See, eg, JM v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 55; Reberger v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 132 (10 
June 2011); Jacobs v The Queen [2011] VSCA 238 (18 August 2011); R v Lakin (2014) 118 SASR 535.
162 See, eg, R v Chandler [2012] NSWCCA 135 (28 June 2012) [56]–[59]; Papas v Western Australia 
[2011] WASCA 3 (10 January 2011) [14]; R v van Setten [2012] SASCFC 90 (1 August 2012) [25]. It is 
important to note that the task of assessing the relative significance of intoxication and mental illness 
was undertaken not only in the sentencing context, but also in trials where the accused’s guilt was 
being assessed: See, eg, Catley v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 249 (31 October 2014); Vulovic v The 
Queen [2013] NSWCCA 340 (20 December 2013); R v Clough [No 2] [2011] 2 Qd R 222; R v Chenery 
[2011] QCA 271 (7 October 2011); A-G (Qld) v Bosanquet [2012] QCA 367 (21 December 2012); 
Namatjira v The Queen [2013] NTCCA 8 (19 July 2013); Goodridge v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 
37 (26 March 2014); R v Huni [2014] QCA 324 (5 December 2014).
163 See, eg, Reberger v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 132 (10 June 2011).
164 [2013] NSWCCA 69 (5 April 2013).
165 Ibid [35].
166 See, eg, DPP (Vic) v Sullivan [2014] VSCA 222 (17 September 2014) [51], [54]; DPP (Vic) v Edwards 
(2012) 44 VR 114, 141 [126]–[128].
167 See, eg, R v van Setten [2012] SASCFC 90 (1 August 2012) [25]; Papas v Western Australia [2011] 
WASCA 3 (10 January 2011) [14].
168 [2011] VSCA 253 (25 August 2011).
169 Ibid [62]–[66].
170 [2013] NSWCCA 126 (24 May 2013).
Evidence of Intoxication in Australian Criminal Courts: A Complex Variable with Multiple 
Effects
181
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that a history of alcohol 
(and ‘Stilnox’) use was influential in the conclusion that there was little basis for 
mitigation based on mental illness (depression).171
The task is especially complicated where the mental illness in question is a drug 
dependence disorder, and the offender was intoxicated by the drug(s) in question 
at the time of the offence.172
4  Mitigation: Indigenous Community Disadvantage
During the period under review the High Court of Australia handed down two 
important decisions; Bugmy v The Queen,173 and Munda v Western Australia,174 that 
clarify the circumstances under which intoxication associated with a background 
of AOD-related disadvantage — such as has been recognised as occurring in 
some Indigenous communities — may provide grounds for mitigation. The 
decisions came more than two decades after the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales decision in R v Fernando.175 In this case, Wood J outlined a set of principles 
to guide the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders where community disadvantage 
formed part of the background to the offending behaviour.176
In Bugmy, the High Court described the scope and relevance of Fernando as 
follows:
The propositions stated in Fernando are largely directed to the significance of 
the circumstance that the offender was intoxicated at the time of the offence. As 
Wood J explained, drunkenness does not usually operate by way of excuse or to 
mitigate an offender’s conduct. However, his Honour recognised that there are 
Aboriginal communities in which alcohol abuse and alcohol-related violence go 
hand in hand.177
The Court went on to hold that the relevant principles do not apply only to 
Aboriginal offenders: ‘There is no warrant, in sentencing an Aboriginal 
offender in New South Wales, to apply a method of analysis different from that 
which applies in sentencing a non-Aboriginal offender.’178 In Munda the Court 
counselled against an approach to intoxication-based mitigation which would 
treat ‘Aboriginal offending … as less serious than offending by persons of other 
171 Ibid [136].
172 See, eg, Carpenter v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 130 (30 May 2013) [22], where the Court observed: 
‘Dr Nielssen diagnosed a substance abuse disorder based upon the applicant’s account of longstanding 
cannabis use, binge drinking and frequent episodes of amnesia whilst under the effects of alcohol. 
Despite accepting that the applicant’s state of intoxication contributed to the offending in the sense 
that he was unlikely to have committed the offences if sober, his Honour was not satisfied that the 
applicant’s substance abuse disorder mitigated the objective seriousness of his offending. This was 
not subject to any challenge on the appeal’.
173 (2013) 249 CLR 571 (‘Bugmy’).
174 (2013) 249 CLR 600 (‘Munda’).
175 (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 (‘Fernando’).
176 Ibid 62–3.
177 Bugmy (2013) 249 CLR 571, 593 [38].
178 Ibid 592 [36].
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ethnicities’.179 In addition, the Court emphasised that ‘it would be wrong to accept 
that a victim of violence by an Aboriginal offender is somehow less in need, or 
deserving, of such protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide’.180 
Technically, the relevant mitigating factor may apply whether or not the offender 
was intoxicated at the time of the offence in question,181 but the majority of 
the cases in which Fernando/Bugmy/Munda submissions are made involve an 
intoxicated offender. 
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Prince v The 
Queen,182 decided after Bugmy and Munda, is illustrative: 
The appellant reported exposure to cannabis at age 13 and to alcohol at age 14. 
After his father’s death alcohol use increased to daily intake, to the point of 
blacking out. While intoxicated he was involved in aggressive behaviour, fighting 
with both strangers and family. In the community the longest period he had spent 
alcohol free was one month. He did not experience difficulty abstaining while 
in custody, but used alcohol to self medicate. His alcohol abuse led directly to 
increased aggressive and criminal behaviour. … 
The evidence of the appellant’s awful childhood experiences of violence and 
drug and alcohol abuse, cast significant light on his ongoing problems with anger 
management, violence and criminal conduct throughout his adult life, so as to 
reduce his moral culpability for his inability to control himself.183
This case suggests that, even after Bugmy, it is accurate to identify the Indigenous 
community disadvantage mode of AOD-related mitigation as one of the contexts 
in which intoxication may have a mitigating effect on sentence.
5  Aggravation
In addition to those contexts in which legislation prescribes intoxication as 
an aggravating factor,184 there are three circumstances in which courts treat 
intoxication as an aggravating factor when sentencing an offender — two that 
relate to offender intoxication and one that relates to victim intoxication. 
First, offender intoxication may be regarded as an aggravating factor if the court 
determines that s/he was ‘recklessly’ intoxicated; that is, the offender knew, based 
on previous personal experience, that when s/he consumes alcohol (and/or other 
179 Munda (2013) 249 CLR 600, 619 [53].
180 Ibid.
181 In Bugmy (2013) 249 CLR 571, the offender was not intoxicated at the time of the commission of the 
offence.
182 [2013] NSWCCA 274 (18 November 2013).
183 Ibid [136], [150]. See also R v YS [2014] NSWCCA 226 (23 October 2014); R v Williams [2014] ACTCA 
30 (18 August 2014) [7].
184 See, eg, dangerous operation of a vehicle while ‘adversely affected by an intoxicating substance’: 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 328A(2)(a). This phrase is also now used in ch 35A of the Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld): See Quilter et al, The Definition and Significance of ‘Intoxication’ in Australian Criminal 
Law, above n 6, 50.
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drugs) that s/he is at greater risk of offending or becoming violent.185 In Dosen v 
The Queen,186 the Victorian Court of Appeal explained as follows: ‘[i]ntoxication 
— whether by alcohol or drugs — can be a circumstance of aggravation where it 
is shown that the offender had foreknowledge that, if he became intoxicated, he 
was likely to behave as he did on the relevant occasion.’187 The rationale for this 
approach is illustrated by the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v 
John:188
The prosecutor responded that the notion of reduced moral culpability through 
mental disease or illness was not applicable to someone who had notice almost 
20 years ago that when he drinks he behaves violently. The appellant knew that his 
self-induced intoxication could result in him behaving in a serious violent manner 
towards others and yet he again drank to excess on this occasion.189
Although aggravation in such circumstances appears consonant with (subjective) 
principles of criminal responsibility, it is not entirely clear what evidence needs 
to be before the sentencing court before an offender can be regarded as having 
been ‘recklessly’ intoxicated. Should there be evidence of previous offending? 
Is evidence of previous (AOD-related) offending required? Or will evidence 
of previous AOD abuse or addiction be sufficient? (If so, how are ‘abuse and 
‘addiction’ defined?)190 Must it be shown that the offender had insight about the role 
of AOD consumption in her/his criminal behaviour? Or is such a person ‘deemed’ 
to have such insight, by virtue of past offending while intoxicated? The relevance 
of these questions is magnified further by the fact that, in the sentencing process, 
unless they form part of agreed facts, the presence of aggravating factors must be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt (whereas mitigating factors can be established 
on the balance of probabilities).191
Secondly, offender intoxication may be an aggravating factor where the crime in 
question takes the form of ‘random’ street violence. Without expressly naming 
public intoxication as an aggravating factor, courts have indicated that such cases 
give rise to a greater need for specific and general deterrence. For example, in R v 
Levy; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld),192 the Queensland Court of Appeal said:
185 See, eg, Mendes v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 161; MDZ v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 243 (15 
November 2011); Gosland v The Queen [2013] VSCA 269 (24 September 2013); R v Lutze (2014) 121 
SASR 144; Victor v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 94 (13 April 2011).
186 [2012] VSCA 307 (14 December 2012).
187 Ibid [18].
188 [2014] QCA 86 (24 April 2014). 
189 Ibid [47]; see also Small v The Queen (2013) 231 A Crim R 279.
190 See generally Kate Seear and Suzanne Fraser, ‘Beyond Criminal Law: The Multiple Constitution of 
Addiction in Australian Legislation’ (2014) 22 Addiction Research and Theory 438.
191 In Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47, 69 [64] the High Court summarised the law as follows: 
‘a sentencing judge may not take facts into account in a way that is adverse to an offender unless those 
facts have been established beyond reasonable doubt and, contrastingly, the offender bears the burden 
of proving on the balance of probabilities matters which are submitted in his or her favour’, citing 
R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270, 281 [25]–[27]. See also Anderson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 
520, 539.
192 (2014) 244 A Crim R 296.
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In my view his Honour gave too little weight to the aspect of public deterrence. 
Cases of this sort often involve young men who are intoxicated and seemingly 
indifferent, at least at the time of their assault, to the consequences of what they 
are doing. In many of the cases the assailants express remorse once they are sober 
and the consequences are known. Many seem to have little in the way of criminal 
history and inevitably, because of their youth, have some prospects of rehabilitation 
and employment. But all of those matters cannot deny, in an appropriate case, the 
need for public deterrence to be recognised by a term of actual imprisonment.193
Thirdly, victim intoxication may be regarded as an aggravating factor where it 
increased her/his vulnerability, especially where there is evidence that the offender 
exploited this vulnerability.194 The large majority of cases in which this mode of 
intoxication-related aggravation was operative were sexual offence cases.195
V  CONCLUSION
Our original motivation for the project from which this article emanates was 
a concern that recent policy debates and law reform proposals and initiatives, 
particularly in relation to ‘alcohol-fuelled violence’,196 were not underpinned 
by a sound appreciation of the complex status quo on the relationship between 
intoxication and criminal law. Some of the insights offered in this article about 
the complex and multiple effects of intoxication evidence in criminal cases may 
already be familiar to criminal law practitioners through their experience in 
trials and sentencing hearings, but they have never before been documented in 
the scholarly literature. The focus in this article has been on the presentation 
and analysis of original quantitative and qualitative data on how the concept of 
‘intoxication’ is understood, and how it operates, in Australian criminal courts, 
rather than the articulation of specific recommendations for law reform or policy 
adjustment. However, consistent with our commitment to effective knowledge 
transfer, we hope that the findings and analysis presented in this article can form 
a constructive part of the evidence base for policy debates and future law reform 
proposals, and can serve as a catalyst for wider scholarly interest in an aspect of 
criminal law and justice administration that has been under-researched.  
193 Ibid 313 [77]. See also Hards v The Queen [2013] VSCA 119 (7 May 2013); DPP (Tas) v Blackaby 
[2013] TASCCA 4 (7 June 2013); O’Reilly v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 14 (24 September 2014); R v 
Loveridge (2014) 243 A Crim R 31.
194 In some jurisdictions, sentencing legislation expressly treats as an aggravating factor circumstances 
in which the offender causes the victim’s intoxication: see, eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)(cb). 
195 See, eg, R v Nabegeyo (2014) 34 NTLR 154; R v Lee [2012] QCA 239 (7 September 2012); R v Brace 
[2011] SASCFC 54 (14 June 2011); R v Djordjevic [2012] SASCFC 69 (15 June 2012); Lim v Western 
Australia [2010] WASCA 186 (23 September 2010); Miles v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 93 (18 
May 2010); Western Australia v Staniforth-Smith [2014] WASCA 170 (5 September 2014); Prempeh v 
Western Australia [2013] WASCA 150 (19 June 2013).
196 See Quilter, ‘One-Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an Aggravating 
Factor’, above n 1.
Evidence of Intoxication in Australian Criminal Courts: A Complex Variable with Multiple 
Effects
185
This article confirms that decisions about intoxication are made at multiple 
points in the criminal justice system and the gross depiction of the criminal 
justice system as excessively generous to intoxicated defendants is inaccurate. 
Depending on the question to be answered, intoxication evidence may render it 
more or less likely that the conduct in question will be characterised as criminal, 
and, in the sentencing context, intoxication may serve to mitigate or aggravate 
the sentence. The variation and nuance we have documented here may clash with 
the dominant contemporary political narrative — that adverse moral judgment 
should (always) attach to criminal offending associated with alcohol and drug use. 
They are, however, a logical consequence of the complex relationship between 
intoxication and the enforcement of the criminal law. Future policy debates and 
law reform initiatives should recognise that there is no single characterisation that 
can account for the multiple points at which intoxication may need to be assessed, 




Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571
Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600
2012
Cooper v The Queen (2012) 293 ALR 17
2011
Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
2014
Booth v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 38 (22 August 2014)
Byrne v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 31 (15 August 2014)
Monfries v The Queen (2014) 68 MVR 385
O’Rafferty v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 35 (21 August 2014)
R v Flowers [2014] ACTCA 13 (8 May 2014)
R v Williams (2014) 254 A Crim R 441
2013
McDougall v The Queen [2013] ACTCA 14 (25 March 2013)
2010
Dal Cortivo v The Queen (2010) 204 A Crim R 55
Monash University Law Review (Vol 43, No 1)186
NEW SOUTH WALES
2014
Aitken v The Queen (2014) 68 MVR 334
Ali v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 45 (9 April 2014)
Aslan v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 114 (20 June 2014)
Catley v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 249 (31 October 2014)
Craig v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 243 (31 October 2014)
Dia v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 9 (20 February 2014)
Goodridge v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 37 (26 March 2014)
Greenwood v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 64 (23 April 2014)
Keeley v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 139 (25 July 2014)
Matthews v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 151 (8 August 2014)
Milsom v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 142 (28 July 2014)
Nand v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 293 (5 December 2014)
R v Kyle [2014] NSWCCA 300 (9 December 2014)
R v Loveridge (2014) 243 A Crim R 31
R v YS [2014] NSWCCA 226 (23 October 2014)
Simpson v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 23 (4 March 2014)
Woodward v The Queen (2014) 68 MVR 376
2013
Adzioski v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 69 (5 April 2013)
Buksh v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 60 (11 April 2013)
Carpenter v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 130 (30 May 2013)
Chen v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 116 (22 May 2013)
George v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 263 (12 November 2013)
Melbom v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 210 (9 September 2013)
Nair v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 79 (18 April 2013)
Ngati v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 203 (30 August 2013)
Prince v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 274 (18 November 2013)
R v Ball [2013] NSWCCA 126 (24 May 2013)
R v Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124 (28 May 2013)
R v Wright (2013) 229 A Crim R 245
Small v The Queen (2013) 231 A Crim R 279
Smith v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 64 (27 March 2013)
Smith v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 209 (9 September 2013)
Stewart v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 185 (9 August 2013)
SW v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 103 (7 June 2013)
Vulovic v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 340 (20 December 2013)
Ward v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 46 (1 March 2013)
Willmott v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 244 (5 November 2013)
Youssef v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 308 (6 December 2013)
Zuccarini v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 228 (14 October 2013)
ZZ v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 83 (19 April 2013)




Beldon v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 194 (6 September 2012)
Blackwell v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 227 (1 November 2012)
Buckley v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 85 (7 May 2012)
Gommesen v The Queen (2012) 62 MVR 196
JB v The Queen (2012) 83 NSWLR 153
JM v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 55
JT v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 133 (28 June 2012)
KR v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 32 (14 March 2012)
Lute v The Queen (2012) 60 MVR 475 
Mendes v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 161
R v Brown [2012] NSWCCA 199 (18 September 2012)
R v Chandler [2012] NSWCCA 135 (28 June 2012)
R v GWM [2012] NSWCCA 240 (21 November 2012)
R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 (6 February 2012)
R v Murrell [2012] NSWCCA 90 (9 May 2012)
R v Nykolyn [2012] NSWCCA 219 (17 August 2012)
Stewart v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 183 (29 August 2012)
Sullivan v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 490
Tweeddale v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 99 (21 May 2012)
Webb v The Queen (2012) 225 A Crim R 550
Williams v The Queen (2012) 229 A Crim R 67
2011
Abdel-Hady v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 196 (28 October 2011)
BIP v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 224 (14 October 2011)
Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119
Burns v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 240
CW v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 45 (22 March 2011)
Foster v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 285 (20 December 2011)
LB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 220 (7 October 2011)
McClain v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 191 (30 June 2011)
MDZ v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 243 (15 November 2011)
Reberger v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 132 (10 June 2011)
Rotner v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 207 (8 September 2011)
R v AB (2011) 59 MVR 356
R v KB [2011] NSWCCA 190 (2 September 2011)
R v West [2011] NSWCCA 91 (12 April 2011)
Shepherd v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 245 (17 November 2011)
Smith v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 110 (13 May 2011)
Smith v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 290 (23 November 2011)
2010
Ali v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 35 (2 March 2010)
Bourke v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 38
BP v The Queen (2010) 201 A Crim R 379
Monash University Law Review (Vol 43, No 1)188
Butters v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 1 (4 February 2010)
Hutchison v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 122 (11 June 2010)
Jones v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 117 (4 June 2010)
Josefski v The Queen (2010) 217 A Crim R 183
King v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 202 (10 September 2010)
McDonald v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 220 (30 September 2010)
Still v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 131 (23 June 2010)
Woodbridge v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 503
NORTHERN TERRITORY
2014
O’Reilly v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 14 (24 September 2014)
R v Nabegeyo (2014) 34 NTLR 154
Wesley v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 17 (17 October 2014)
2013
Green v The Queen [2013] NTCCA 14 (31 October 2013)
Namatjira v The Queen [2013] NTCCA 8 (19 July 2013)
2012
Goddard v The Queen [2012] NTCCA 6 (8 March 2012)
2011
Blacker v The Queen (2011) 252 FLR 338
R v Wilson (2011) 30 NTLR 51
2010
Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31
QUEENSLAND
2014
Queensland Police Service v Terare (2014) 245 A Crim R 211
R v Baker [2014] QCA 5 (7 February 2014)
R v Boubaris [2014] QCA 199 (22 August 2014)
R v Castle; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [2014] QCA 276 (7 November 2014)
R v Civic [2014] QCA 322 (5 December 2014)
R v Davidson [2014] QCA 348 (19 December 2014)
R v Douglas (2014) 243 A Crim R 454
R v Huni [2014] QCA 324 (5 December 2014)
R v John [2014] QCA 86 (24 April 2014)
R v Johnson [2014] QCA 79 (15 April 2014)
R v Kleimeyer [2014] QCA 56 (28 March 2014)
R v Levy; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2014) 244 A Crim R 296
Evidence of Intoxication in Australian Criminal Courts: A Complex Variable with Multiple 
Effects
189
R v Nikora (2014) 243 A Crim R 489
R v Porter [2014] QCA 14 (14 February 2014)
R v Williams; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2014) 247 A Crim R 250
2013
A-G (Qld) v Fardon [2013] QCA 299 (10 October 2013)
Commissioner of Police v Stehbens [2013] QCA 81 (16 April 2013)
R v Anthony [2013] QCA 95 (3 May 2013)
R v Brown [2013] QCA 185 (16 July 2013)
R v George [2014] 2 Qd R 150 
R v Glenbar (2013) 240 A Crim R 22
R v Langlo & Nuggins [2013] QCA 117 (21 May 2013)
R v McGuire [2013] QCA 290 (4 October 2013)
R v Mitchell [2013] QCA 248 (6 September 2013)
2012
A-G (Qld) v Bosanquet [2012] QCA 367 (21 December 2012)
A-G (Qld) v Ellis [2012] QCA 182 (29 June 2012)
Hocking v A-G (Qld) [2012] QCA 65 (23 March 2012)
R v Bacon [2012] QCA 340 (7 December 2012)
R v Davis [2012] QCA 97 (17 April 2012)
R v Edwards [2012] QCA 117 (4 May 2012)
R v Elomari [2012] QCA 27 (28 February 2012)
R v Gulbis-Paris [2012] QCA 348 (7 December 2012)
R v Hart [2012] QCA 38 (6 March 2012)
R v Hill [2012] QCA 59 (20 March 2012)
R v Kay [2012] QCA 327 (30 November 2012)
R v Lee [2012] QCA 313 (16 November 2012)
R v Logan [2012] QCA 210 (17 August 2012)
R v Ma [2012] QCA 317 (20 November 2012)
R v PAO [2012] QCA 8 (10 February 2012)
R v Quinlan [2012] QCA 132 (22 May 2012)
R v Sailor [2012] QCA 246 (13 September 2012)
2011
LAB v A-G (Qld) [2011] QCA 230 (13 September 2011)
R v Almotared [2011] QCA 128 (17 June 2011)
R v Butler; R v Lawton; R v Marshall [2011] QCA 265 (4 October 2011)
R v Chenery [2011] QCA 271 (7 October 2011)
R v Derks [2011] QCA 295 (21 October 2011)
R v Evans and Pearce [2011] 2 Qd R 571
R v GAM [2011] QCA 288 (18 October 2011)
R v Grimaldi [2011] QCA 114 (3 June 2011)
R v Handley [2011] QCA 361 (13 December 2011)
R v Harold [2011] QCA 99 (17 May 2011)
R v Hopper [2011] QCA 296 (21 October 2011)
Monash University Law Review (Vol 43, No 1)190
R v Lacey & Lacey [2011] QCA 386 (23 December 2011)
R v Martin [2011] QCA 342 (29 November 2011)
R v O’Loughlin [2011] QCA 123 (10 June 2011)
R v Ray [2011] QCA 365 (13 December 2011)
R v Thomason; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [2011] QCA 9 (11 February 2011)
R v Toohey [2011] QCA 354 (9 December 2011)
R v TX [2011] 2 Qd R 247 
2010
R v Barden [2010] QCA 374 (23 December 2010)
R v Blackaby [2010] QCA 84 (16 April 2010)
R v CAW [2010] QCA 103 (7 May 2010)
R v Clough [No 2] [2011] 2 Qd R 222
R v Davy [2010] QCA 118 (21 May 2010)
R v Frank [2010] QCA 150 (18 June 2010)
R v Harold [2010] QCA 267 (8 October 2010)
R v Tapara [2010] QCA 320 (16 November 2010)
R v Taylor (2010) 203 A Crim R 302
R v Williamson [2010] QCA 277 (15 October 2010)
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
2014
R v Carberry [2014] SASCFC 78 (18 July 2014)
R v Ceruto (2014) 66 MVR 94
R v Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91 (13 August 2014)
R v Lakin (2014) 118 SASR 535 
R v Lindsay (2014) 119 SASR 320
R v Lutze (2014) 121 SASR 144
R v Marafioti (2014) 118 SASR 511
2013
R v Compton; R v Barratt (2013) 237 A Crim R 177
R v Nedza [2013] SASCFC 142 (18 December 2013)
R v Wymond; R v Evans [2013] SASCFC 12 (14 March 2013)
2012
R v Belczacki (2012) 112 SASR 95
R v Djordjevic [2012] SASCFC 69 (15 June 2012)
R v van Setten [2012] SASCFC 90 (1 August 2012)
2011
R v Betts [2011] SASCFC 27 (21 April 2011)
R v Brace [2011] SASCFC 54 (14 June 2011)
R v Higgs (2011) 111 SASR 42 
R v Ossitt (2011) 274 LSJS 516 
Evidence of Intoxication in Australian Criminal Courts: A Complex Variable with Multiple 
Effects
191
R v Sierke [2011] SASCFC 53 (10 June 2011)
R v Smith (2011) 277 LSJS 438 
R v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346
R v Wait [2011] SASCFC 91 (19 August 2011)
2010
R v Daniel (2010) 273 LSJS 271
R v Heyward & Minter [2010] SASCFC 38 (28 September 2010)
R v Rahmanian [2010] SASC 137 (12 May 2010)
TASMANIA
2014
Tap v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 5 (14 November 2014)
2013
DPP (Tas) v Blackaby [2013] TASCCA 4 (7 June 2013)
DPP (Tas) v CSS [2013] TASCCA 10 (8 October 2013)
Smart v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 15 (23 December 2013)
2011
DPP (Tas) v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 (21 April 2011)
DPP (Tas) v Rogers [2011] TASCCA 17 (9 November 2011)
DPP (Tas) v Smithurst (2011) 60 MVR 34
KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425 
2010
Barron v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 114
DPP (Tas) v Broadby, Cockshutt and Woolley (2010) 20 Tas R 399
Gregson v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 4 (24 March 2010)
Moyle v Tasmania (2010) 55 MVR 61 
Startup v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 5 (10 May 2010)
VICTORIA
2014
AS v The Queen [2014] VSCA 83 (7 May 2014)
Audsley v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 506
Bray (A Pseudonym) v The Queen (2014) 46 VR 623
Buchanan (A Pseudonym) v Secretary to the Department of Health (2014) 43 VR 
210
DPP (Vic) v Sullivan [2014] VSCA 222 (17 September 2014)
DPP (Vic) v Zarb (2014) 46 VR 832 
Hothnyang v The Queen [2014] VSCA 64 (11 April 2014)
Pasznyk v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 169
Monash University Law Review (Vol 43, No 1)192
Rana v The Queen [2014] VSCA 198 (4 September 2014)
Saw Wah v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 440
Singh v The Queen [2014] VSCA 250 (7 October 2014)
Ulutui v The Queen (2014) 41 VR 676
West v The Queen [2014] VSCA 36 (13 March 2014)
2013
Amato v The Queen [2013] VSCA 346 (3 December 2013)
Arthars v The Queen; Plater v R (2013) 39 VR 613
Crocker v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 668
Dong v The Queen [2013] VSCA 354 (5 December 2013)
Gosland v The Queen; McDonald v The Queen [2013] VSCA 269 (24 September 
2013)
Hards v The Queen [2013] VSCA 119 (7 May 2013)
Nash v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 134 
Niaros v The Queen [2013] VSCA 249 (13 September 2013)
Tunja v The Queen (2013) 41 VR 208
2012
Acar v The Queen [2012] VSCA 8 (2 February 2012)
Dosen v The Queen [2012] VSCA 307 (14 December 2012)
DPP (Vic) v Edwards (2012) 44 VR 114
DPP (Vic) v Werry (2012) 37 VR 524 
Eade v The Queen; Vanstone v The Queen (2012) 35 VR 526
Hegarty v The Queen [2012] VSCA 252 (11 October 2012)
IK v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2012] VSCA 12 (10 February 2012)
Morrison v The Queen [2012] VSCA 222 (14 September 2012)
NJ v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 522 
Phillips v The Queen (2012) 37 VR 594
Roberts v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 452
RSJ v The Queen [2012] VSCA 148 (29 June 2012)
Shaw v The Queen [2012] VSCA 78 (2 May 2012)
2011
Ashdown v The Queen (2011) 37 VR 341
Baltas v The Queen [2011] VSCA 169 (10 June 2011)
Bennett v The Queen [2011] VSCA 253 (25 August 2011)
DPP (Vic) v Gerrard (2011) 211 A Crim R 171
Gorladenchearau v The Queen (2011) 34 VR 149
Halamboulis v The Queen; DPP (Vic) v Halamboulis [2011] VSCA 449 (22 
December 2011)
Jacobs v The Queen; Ross v The Queen [2011] VSCA 238 (18 August 2011)
Johnson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 360 (14 November 2011)
Johnstone v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 320 
Kavanagh v The Queen [2011] VSCA 234 (18 August 2011)
Khan v The Queen [2011] VSCA 286 (23 September 2011)
Evidence of Intoxication in Australian Criminal Courts: A Complex Variable with Multiple 
Effects
193
Mitic v The Queen [2011] VSCA 373 (30 November 2011)
Neal v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 454
Rintoull v The Queen [2011] VSCA 245 (23 August 2011)
Sharma v The Queen [2011] VSCA 356 (21 November 2011)
Sibanda v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 67
2010
Aidid v The Queen; MA v The Queen (2010) 25 VR 593
Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297
Hasan v The Queen (2010) 31 VR 28 
Hudson v The Queen (2010) 30 VR 610
MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305
R v Simon [2010] VSCA 66 (31 March 2010)
Tancredi v The Queen; Pamvouxoglou v The Queen [2010] VSCA 157 (8 June 
2010)
Wills v The Queen [2010] VSCA 235 (14 September 2010)
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
2014
Blurton v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 61 (21 March 2014)
Dixon v Western Australia [No 2] [2014] WASCA 1 (8 January 2014)
Millar v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 2 (8 January 2014)
Moir v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 25 (4 February 2014)
Pearce v Western Australia [2014] WASCA 156 (28 August 2014)
Western Australia v Camus (2014) 240 A Crim R 384 
Western Australia v Hassell [2014] WASCA 158 (27 August 2014)
Western Australia v Staniforth-Smith [2014] WASCA 170 (5 September 2014)
Western Australia v Walley [2014] WASCA 85 (23 April 2014)
2013
Colbung v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 257 (6 November 2013)
Field v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 209 (6 September 2013)
Goodwyn v Western Australia (2013) 45 WAR 328
Heaton v Western Australia (2013) 234 A Crim R 409
Munmurrie v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 167 (25 July 2013)
Oubid v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 79 (21 March 2013)
Peters v Western Australia [No 2] (2013) 65 MVR 13 
Pool v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 274 (2 December 2013)
Prempeh v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 150 (19 June 2013)
Toki v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 214 (17 September 2013)
Western Australia v Lee [2013] WASCA 246 (22 October 2013)
2012
Kaschull v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 245 (29 November 2012)
Liu v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 218 (31 October 2012)
Monash University Law Review (Vol 43, No 1)194
Lodge v Magorian (2012) 42 WAR 270
McLaughlin v Western Australia (2012) 224 A Crim R 134
PDT v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 134 (20 June 2012)
Singh v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 262 (11 December 2012)
Western Australia v Munda (2012) 43 WAR 137
Windie v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 61 (21 March 2012)
2011
Brown v Western Australia (2011) 207 A Crim R 533
Caulfield v Western Australia [No 2] [2011] WASCA 230 (24 October 2011)
DBW (a child) v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 206 (30 September 2011)
Evans v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 182 (5 September 2011)
GJT v Western Australia (2011) 214 A Crim R 272
Langdon v Kelemete-Leoli-McLean (2011) 206 A Crim R 368
Narkle v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 160 (26 July 2011)
Papas v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 3 (10 January 2011)
Victor v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 94 (13 April 2011)
Western Australia v Silich (2011) 43 WAR 285
Wongawol v Western Australia (2011) 42 WAR 91
WP v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 198 (22 September 2011)
2010
Austic v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 110 (11 June 2010)
Barron v Western Australia (2010) 55 MVR 123 
Butler v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 104 (31 May 2010)
Cook v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 241 (22 December 2010)
Lim v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 186 (23 September 2010)
McKey v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 210 (29 October 2010)
Miles v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 93 (18 May 2010)
Powell v Tickner (2010) 203 A Crim R 421
Prazmo v Western Australia [No 2] [2010] WASCA 99 (25 May 2010)
Waldron v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 63 (7 April 2010)
Ward v Western Australia [No 2] [2010] WASCA 208 (27 October 2010)
Wright v Western Australia (2010) 43 WAR 1
